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I. Introduction
Both the United States and its constituent states have enacted
arbitration statutes.' Under the Supremacy Clause, provisions in
state arbitration laws may apply to the extent such provisions do
not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act.2 The Supreme Court
has recognized that state arbitration law may govern matters not
addressed by the FAA except that the FAA will preempt state
statutory provisions in conflict with the FAA.'
The Federal Arbitration Act contains provisions that apply to
international commercial arbitrations conducted in the United
States and that incorporate standards under which courts in the
United States may recognize and enforce international arbitral
awards pursuant to the treaty obligations of the United States.
Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act applies to written
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 [hereinafter FAA]. In 1925,
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act primarily to overcome judicial reluctance
to enforce agreements to arbitrate. "[T]he legislative history reveals that the drafters
viewed the primary authority for the [Federal Arbitration] Act to be congressional power
to regulate federal court procedure" and did not intend for the FAA to "nullify
substantive rights governed by state law." Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State
Relations under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 61, 76-77 (1985). For a
detailed study of the legislative history of the FAA, see generally IAN MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992). Every state has enacted some form of commercial
arbitration legislation. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have patterned
their domestic arbitration statutes after the Uniform Arbitration Act. See 7 U.L.A. 199-
201 (1997); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
3 In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University, the Supreme Court declared that
[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. But even when
Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in an area, state law may
nonetheless be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law--that is, to the extent that it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))
(citations omitted).
[Vol. 22
STATE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION STATUTES
arbitration agreements contained in contracts evidencing a
transaction involving the foreign commerce of the United States.!
Moreover, chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA implement the obligations
of the United States to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards that fall under the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards5 and the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration.'
Chapter 1 of the FAA contains provisions that apply primarily
to the enforcement of international agreements to arbitrate in the
United States or the confirmation of international arbitral awards
rendered in the United States! Few provisions in chapter 1 of the
I See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA also apply to written
arbitration agreements in maritime transactions within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States or contained in contracts evidencing interstate commerce. See id.
5 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the United States' obligations under the New York
Convention. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. For further discussion of the scope and
application of chapter 2 of the FAA, see infra notes 62-65 and 69-72 and accompanying
text.
6 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30,
1975, reprinted in 3 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 15 (1978) [hereinafter Inter-American
Convention]. Chapter 3 of the FAA implements the United States' obligations under the
Inter-American Convention. 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. While foreign arbitral awards
rendered in nations that are contracting parties to the Inter-American Convention and
agreements to arbitrate that could result in such awards are within the scope of chapter 3
of the FAA, neither the Convention, chapter 3, nor case law indicate the extent that
international arbitral awards rendered in the United States or arbitration agreements that
could result in such awards are subject to chapter 3 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 304;
Inter-American Convention, supra, art. 4. Since this limits the number of preemption
issues raised by the coexistence of the Inter-American Convention, chapter 3 of the
FAA, and the state statutes analyzed in this study, the author chooses not to examine the
scope and application of chapter 3 of the FAA in depth. In addition, except for Mexico,
few important U.S. trading partners have become parties to the Inter-American
Convention, which lessens the treaty's significance. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 319
(1994). As of January 1, 1996, the United States and eleven other member states of the
Organization of American States were parties to the Inter-American Convention. See
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PuB. No. 9433, TREATIES
IN FORCE 317 (1996). El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay were the only parties to the
Inter-American Convention that were not parties to the New York Convention. See id.
at 316-17.
7 In order to enforce international arbitration agreements, chapter 1 contains
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FAA authorize action by the arbitrators or intervention by the
courts to further the conduct of an arbitration.8
Chapter 2 of the FAA contains provisions that enforce
international arbitration agreements subject to the New York
Convention and that confirm or enforce international arbitral
awards subject to the Convention.9 The FAA's chapter 2 contains
no additional provisions authorizing specific action by the
arbitrators or intervention by the courts to further the conduct of an
international arbitration.'0
provisions authorizing designated courts to stay judicial proceedings before them
involving arbitrable issues or to compel arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. Section 3 of
the FAA authorizes "courts of the United States" to stay proceedings before them
involving "issue[s] referable to arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 4 of the FAA allows
United States district courts to issue orders compelling arbitration "within the district in
which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed." 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section
9 of the FAA's chapter 1 provides that the designated court must confirm an award
rendered in the United States, unless the court vacates the award pursuant to section 10.
See 9 U.S.C. § 9. Section 10 of the FAA specifies the grounds upon which "the United
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made" may issue an order
vacating such an award. 9 U.S.C. § 10. Section 9 provides that the appropriate court
may also refuse to confirm an award if the court issues an order modifying or correcting
the award pursuant to section 11!. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 11.
8 An exception is section 7 which authorizes the arbitrators to summon
witnesses to attend the arbitral proceedings or to order the production of "material"
evidence at the arbitral proceedings. See 9 U.S.C. § 7. Pursuant to section 7, the United
States district court in the district where the arbitrators are sitting may compel the
attendance of such witnesses and may utilize its contempt powers to enforce the
arbitrators' summons. See id.
9 Section 206 provides that a court with jurisdiction under chapter 2 may issue
orders compelling the parties to arbitrate. See 9 U.S.C. § 206. Section 206 authorizes
court orders compelling arbitration according to the parties' arbitration agreement
whether the place of arbitration is within or without the United States. See id. Section
207 authorizes a court with jurisdiction under chapter 2 to confirm an international
arbitral award rendered in the United States subject to the New York Convention or to
enforce a foreign arbitral award subject to the Convention unless the court invokes one
of the grounds specified in Article V of the New York Convention in order to vacate or
deny enforcement to such an award. See 9 U.S.C. § 207; New York Convention, supra
note 5, art. V. For further discussion concerning the application of section 207 to
confirm an international arbitral award rendered in the United States, see infra notes
125-26 and accompanying text. For further discussion concerning the application of
section 207 to enforce a foreign arbitral award subject to the New York Convention, see
infra note 75.
"Other provisions in chapter 2 of the FAA concern such matters as jurisdiction,
venue, and removal of cases from state courts. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203-205. Moreover,
section 208 of chapter 2 of the FAA provides that chapter 1 provisions apply to "actions
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In an attempt to make their states attractive forums for
conducting international commercial arbitrations, ten states have
enacted state legislation applicable to international commercial
arbitration." State international arbitration statutes contain
provisions concerning matters addressed expressly by provisions
in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA. Such state legislation authorizes
state court intervention to enforce international agreements to
arbitrate within the respective state, by means of stay orders or
orders compelling the parties to arbitrate. "2 State statutes authorize
their respective state courts to confirm or vacate international
arbitral awards rendered within the particular state. 3 In addition,
and proceedings" brought under chapter 2 to the extent that the pertinent chapter 1
provisions do not conflict with chapter 2 or the New York Convention as ratified by the
United States. See 9 U.S.C. § 208.
"See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-1297.432 (West 1996); UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-
100 - 50a-136 (West 1994); Florida International Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
684.01-684.35 (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-
9-30-9-9-43 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.); Hawaii International Arbitration, Mediation,
and Conciliation Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658D-1-658D-9 (Supp. 1992); Maryland
International Commercial Arbitration Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-
01-3-2B-09 (1995); North Carolina International Commercial Arbitration Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-1-567.68 (1996); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2712.01-2712.91
(Banks-Baldwin, WESTLAW through 1996 portion of 121st G.A.); Oregon
International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-
36.558 (1995); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-172.310 (West Supp.
1996). Several state international arbitration statutes contain statements declaring that
the legislation's purpose is to make the state an attractive place for conducting
international commercial arbitration. For example, the North Carolina International
Commercial Arbitration Act contains the following provision:
It is the policy of the State of North Carolina to promote and facilitate
international trade and commerce, and to provide a forum for the resolution of
disputes that may arise from participation therein. Pursuant to this policy, the
purpose of this Article is to encourage the use of arbitration as a means of
resolving such disputes, to provide rules for the conduct of arbitration
proceedings, and to assure access to the courts of this State for legal
proceedings ancillary to such arbitration.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.30. For similar statements of purpose, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
684.02(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-30; HAW. REv. STAT. § 658D-2; MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 3-2B-02; OR. REV. STAT. § 36.452(1).
12See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.81.
13Some state international arbitration statutes contain express provisions
regarding the confirmation or vacation of arbitral awards. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
1-567.64-1-567.65. Other state international arbitration statutes rely on the state's
1997]
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several state international arbitration statutes contain provisions
that expressly address the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.,4
Moreover, state international arbitration statutes contain
provisions concerning matters not addressed expressly in chapter 1
or 2 of the FAA. State international arbitration act provisions
authorize their respective state courts to render judicial assistance
to further the conduct of an international arbitration."
Furthermore, state international arbitration statutes contain
provisions concerning matters of arbitral procedure often
addressed in institutional or ad hoc arbitral rules. 6
Most state international arbitration act provisions either (1)
have been carefully drafted to avoid conflicting with provisions in
chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA or (2) address matters not covered
general arbitration code provisions concerning the confirmation or vacation of arbitral
awards. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-13, 9-9-42.
4For further discussion concerning state international arbitration act provisions
that expressly address the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, see
infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
15Examples of such judicial assistance authorized by state international
arbitration statutes include the issuance of discovery orders or the granting of
provisional measures by state courts in aid of an international arbitration. For discussion
concerning state international arbitration act provisions authorizing their respective state
courts to order discovery or provisional measures, see infra notes 181 and 189 and
accompanying text.
16 For example, sections 1297.131-1297.136 of the California international
arbitration statute provide the procedures under which a party to an arbitration subject to
the California statute may challenge the impartiality of an arbitrator. See CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §§ 1297.131-1297.136. Institutional arbitration rules also provide
procedures for challenging the impartiality of an arbitrator. See, e.g., American
Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules, arts. 7, 8, 9, reprinted in
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: SELECTED
TREATIES, STATUTES, AND RULES 87 (1993); International Chamber of Commerce Rules
of Arbitration, art. 2(8), (9), id. at 99. State international arbitration act provisions that
concern matters of arbitral procedure often included in institutional or ad hoc arbitral
rules would not appear to raise preemption concerns in most cases. However, the author
contends that state international arbitration act provisions authorizing the arbitral
tribunal to rule on questions of the scope or validity of an arbitration agreement may
raise preemption concerns in particular factual circumstances in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920
(1995). For further discussion concerning whether the FAA may preempt state
international arbitration act provisions authorizing the arbitral tribunal to decide
questions of the scope or validity of an arbitration agreement, see infra notes 221-45 and
accompanying text.
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expressly in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA. However, commentators
have concluded that state international arbitration statutes create
significant uncertainty regarding whether federal or state law
applies to international commercial arbitrations conducted in the
United States.
1 7
Supreme Court precedent establishes that the principal purpose
of Congress in enacting the FAA was to ensure the enforcement of
private arbitration agreements according to their terms. The
Supreme Court has held consistently that the FAA preempts state
legislation requiring a judicial forum for claims the parties agreed
17 See Jack Garvey & Totton Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing US.
International Commercial Arbitration Law, 25 INT'L LAW. 209, 215 (1991) ("Whatever
the scope of federal preemption in international arbitration, a shared purview of state and
federal arbitration law generates such uncertainties, though the parties, in choosing
arbitration, have sought predictability. To the extent state jurisdiction is sound and state
law prevails, and to the extent there are ambiguities and inconsistencies from state to
state and between federal and state laws concerning international arbitration, arbitration
in the United States is rendered less viable as a dispute resolution mechanism for
international parties."); J. Stewart McClendon, State International Arbitration Laws:
Are They Needed or Desirable?, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 245, 246 (1990) (declaring that
state international arbitration statutes "introduce uncertainty and confusion into
international commercial arbitration, and are a potential source of conflict and
litigation."); Daniel M. Kolkey, Reflections on the US. Statutory Framework for
International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope, Its Shortcomings, and the
Advantages of US. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 491,
492 (1990) (professing that the enactment of state international arbitration statutes has
"further aggravated the uncertain relationship between federal and state arbitration
laws."); Committee on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration as Federal or State Legislation, ARBITRATION
AND THE LAW 1988-89 250, 260 (1989) [hereinafter New York City Bar Report]
(declaring that adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law as state legislation would "create
confusion abroad concerning the legal regimes governing arbitration in the United
States."); James H. Carter, Federal Arbitration Act Seen As Out of Step With Modern
Laws, 5 NEWS & NOTES FROM THE INSTIT. FOR TRANSNAT'L ARB. 1, 1 (Nov. 4, 1990)
(stating that "questions concerning the relationship between the FAA and U.S. state
international arbitration statutes now cause substantial confusion."). Commentators also
profess that the Supreme Court decision in Volt has heightened the uncertainty whether
federal law or state international arbitration statutes apply. See infra note 25 and
accompanying text.
18 "While Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encourage the
expeditious resolution of disputes, its passage 'was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered."' Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
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to arbitrate. 9 In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.,20 the Court revealed its strong support for the
FAA's purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements according to
their terms. The Moses H. Cone Court affirmed the enforcement
of an arbitration agreement even though this resulted in the
resolution of certain issues by arbitration while other issues that
the parties had not agreed to arbitrate would be subject to judicial
proceedings.2'
Citing the FAA's primary purpose of enforcing arbitration
agreements according to their terms, the Supreme Court in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University2 professed that parties may agree in their
arbitration agreement to apply state arbitration law to an
arbitration within the scope of the FAA even if the application of
such state law provisions effectively frustrates an arbitration that
the FAA would allow to proceed.23 In Volt, the Supreme Court
declared that:
[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth
in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical
to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.
Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of
19See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). For
discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Southland, Perry, and Terninix, see infra
notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
20460 U.S. 1(1983).
21See id. at 19-20. In dicta, the Moses H. Cone Court declared that "federal law
requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.
Under the [Federal] Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced
notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute
but not to the arbitration agreement." Id. at 20.
22489 U.S. 468 (1989). For further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision
in Volt, see infra notes 251-62 and accompanying text.
231n Volt, the Supreme Court did not itself hold that the parties intended to
incorporate state arbitration law rules into their arbitration agreement. Rather, the
Supreme Court refused to disturb the California courts' conclusion on the subject. For
further discussion of this aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt, see infra note
260.
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consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure
their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they limit by
contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they
specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
conducted. Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by
state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the
terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the
FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the
[Federal Arbitration] Act would otherwise permit it to go
forward. By permitting the courts to "rigorously enforce" such
agreements according to their terms, we give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing
24
violence to the policies behind the FAA.
The Volt Court's enforcement of arbitration agreements within
the scope of the FAA according to the terms of such agreements
appears consistent with prior Supreme Court cases. However,
Supreme Court precedent does not support the Volt Court's refusal
to overturn the lower court's holding that the inclusion in the
parties' contract of a standard choice of law clause selecting state
law indicated the parties' intentions to apply state arbitration law
inconsistent with the FAA to their arbitration. Agreeing with the
rulings of the lower courts that by including a choice of law clause
selecting California law the parties intended to incorporate
California arbitration law into their arbitration agreement, the Volt
Court held that the FAA could not preempt state arbitration law in
this circumstance.
Commentators have viewed the Volt decision as creating
greater uncertainty concerning whether the Federal Arbitration Act
or state international arbitration statutes apply to international
arbitrations conducted in the United States when the parties
include a standard choice of law clause selecting state law and an
arbitration agreement in their contract.25 Fearing that the apparent
241d. at 479 (citations omitted).
25See George A. Davidson, et al., Report of the New York State Bar Association
International Litigation Committee, Commercial and Federal Litigation Section: The
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 87, 95 (1990) [hereinafter New York State Bar Report] ("[T]he passage of state
international arbitration laws coupled with the recent Volt case has thrown U.S.
international arbitration law into confusion."); Andre J. Brunel, Note, A Proposal to
Adopt UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as Federal
1997]
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uncertainty regarding the applicable law as a result of the
Law, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 43 (1990) (concluding that after the Volt decision, the question
concerning whether the FAA preempts state international arbitration statutes "remains a
confusing quagmire that will deter prospective arbitration parties from choosing forums
in the United States."); McClendon, supra note 17, at 248 (professing that the Volt
decision adds to the uncertainty concerning whether the FAA preempts state law
provisions that conflict with it).
As discussed in part IV, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. resolves the uncertainties created by the
Volt decision. For further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono,
see infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text. Mastrobuono suggests that parties can
apply state arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA only if the parties include in their
contract a choice of law provision that expressly selects particular state arbitration law
provisions over federal law. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
The author contends that the Mastrobuono decision as well as the Supreme
Court's unwavering support for advancing the FAA's primary purpose of enforcing
private arbitration agreements according to their terms indicate that parties may choose
not to apply federal law derived from the FAA concerning matters of arbitral procedural
by including in their contract a choice of law clause that expressly provides for the
application of particular state arbitration law provisions. The Supreme Court's
unyielding support for, advancing the FAA's primary purpose of enforcing arbitration
agreements according to their terms would appear to allow parties to apply most state
law provisions concerning matters of arbitral procedure. Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA
contain few provisions that apply to matters of arbitral procedure. Thus, a state law
provision concerning a matter of arbitral procedure could conflict with the FAA if such a
state law provision was contrary to federal law derived from the FAA created by judicial
decisions. For example, the FAA does not contain a provision that expressly addresses
whether arbitrators may award punitive damages. However, the Supreme Court
confirmed in Mastrobuono that the FAA does not preclude arbitral awards of punitive
damages. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
For further discussion concerning the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono, see
infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text. In dicta, the Mastrobuono court professed
that if parties provided expressly in their contract that the arbitrators may not award
punitive damages, then the FAA obligates courts to enforce the arbitration agreement
according to the parties' clearly expressed intentions. See id. at 1216. Thus, this
statement by the Court would appear to allow parties who expressly select state law
procedural provisions to exclude the applicability of contrary federal law derived from
the FAA. The Supreme Court has held that section 2 of the FAA's chapter 1 creates
federal substantive law favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements applicable
in state courts. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). For further
discussion of Southland, see infra notes 87-90 and 94-97 and accompanying text. One
could view section 2 as a "mandatory law" provision since Southland and its progeny
establish that the FAA preempts state arbitration law that conflicts with the federal
policy embodied in section 2 of the FAA favoring the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. Thus, it would appear that the
"mandatory" character of section 2 of the FAA would preclude parties from selecting
state arbitration law provisions that may undermine the enforceability of their arbitration
agreement.
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enactment of state international arbitration statutes and the Volt
decision would make the United States an undesirable situs for
international commercial arbitration, commentators have argued
for the reform of federal law with the result that federal law would
apply exclusively to international commercial arbitrations
conducted in the United States. 6
26The New York State Bar Report recommends amendments to the FAA that
expressly preempt state international arbitration statutes, unless the parties explicitly
agree in their written agreement to arbitrate that the provisions of a state international
arbitration statute apply to their international arbitration. See New York State Bar
Report, supra note 25, at 103-05. Specifically, the New York State Bar Report proposes
the addition of the following language to 9 U.S.C. § 208:
An action and proceeding shall be excepted from the provisions of Chapter 1
only if an agreement falling under the Convention explicitly provides that
procedures other than those set forth in Chapter 1 govern the action or
proceeding. A choice of law clause shall not be deemed to be an agreement that
procedures other than those set forth in Chapter 1 govern the action or
proceeding. Except as set forth in this section, state law shall not apply to
actions and proceedings subject to this Chapter and Chapter 1.
Id. at 104. In addition, the New York State Bar Report supports the inclusion of an
additional provision in Chapter 1 of the FAA entitled "International Arbitrations"
containing the following language:
Agreements or contractual provisions described in Section 2 of this Chapter that
concern commerce with foreign nations shall be excepted from the provisions
of this Chapter only if the agreement or contractual provision explicitly
provides that procedures other than those set forth in this Chapter govern the
arbitration action or proceeding. A choice of law clause shall not be deemed to
be an agreement that procedures other than those set forth in this Chapter
govern the arbitration action or proceeding. Except as set forth in this section,
state law shall not apply to arbitration actions or proceedings subject to this
Chapter that concern commerce with foreign nations.
Id. at 105. The New York State Bar Report concludes that
[t]hese amendments to the enabling legislation of the [New York] Convention
and the FAA would mean that, unless parties explicitly agree otherwise, state
law does not apply to international arbitrations. Moreover, the changes would
also provide that, in international arbitrations, choice of law provisions
specifying the substantive law governing the arbitration would not be sufficient
to opt out of federal procedural law. Instead, to do so, the arbitration agreement
must explicitly provide that the arbitration action or proceeding is to be
governed by procedural law other than the FAA and the [New York]
Convention.
Id. at 105.
Other commentators advocate the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration as federal law in part to preempt state international
19971
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This article examines the scope and applicability of state
international arbitration statutes in order to evaluate the position
advocated by commentators that state international arbitration
statutes and the Volt decision cause confusion and uncertainty as
to the applicable international commercial arbitration law, a
situation that these commentators argue warrants reform of the
FAA to preempt state international arbitration statutes. While
arbitration statutes. See Kolkey, supra note 17, at 492 (recommending the enactment of
UNCITRAL Model Law as federal law to preempt state law and eliminate the uncertain
relationship between federal and state law); Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 17, at
211-21 (contending that federal law should apply exclusively to international
commercial arbitration and advocating adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law as
federal law); Brunei, supra note 25, at 68 (supporting enactment of the UNCITRAL
Model Law as federal law to completely preempt state law in the area of international
commercial arbitration). For the text of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, see Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law: Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
27The parties to an international arbitration may agree to apply institutional
arbitration rules, such as those of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or ad hoc arbitration rules, such as the
UNCITRAL Rules, to address procedural matters not covered by the FAA. The
selection of arbitral rules will preclude in most instances the application of provisions in
state international arbitration statutes analogous to the particular arbitral rules selected
by the parties. The FAA and arbitration rules selected by the parties are sufficient to
regulate most issues concerning an international commercial arbitration that falls within
the scope of the FAA. However, provisions in state international arbitration statutes
appear to apply to arbitration agreements and awards not covered by the FAA. Part II
discusses the scope and applicability of state international arbitration statutes. See infra
notes 32-78 and accompanying text. Moreover, provisions in state international
arbitration statutes may also apply to arbitration agreements or awards within the scope
of chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA to the extent that the FAA does not preempt such
provisions. Part III discusses whether the FAA may preempt provisions in selected state
international arbitration statutes. See infra notes 79-246 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, part IV argues that state international arbitration act provisions
inconsistent withchapter I or 2 of the FAA may only apply if the parties include in their
contract a choice of law clause that expressly selects such state law provisions. See infra
notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
This article will not evaluate the arguments of commentators who advocate
adoption of the entire UNCITRAL Model Law as federal legislation. It is widely
recognized that the FAA and the relevant case law strongly support the enforcement of
international commercial arbitration agreements and the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitral awards. See, e.g., Charles A. Hunnicutt, et al., Report to The
Washington Foreign Law Society on The UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 303, 311 (1988) [hereinafter
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one could attempt to draw conclusions with broader applications
from an examination of the scope and applicability of state
international arbitration statutes, this study does not have such a
28purpose.
Washington Foreign Law Society Report); McClendon, supra note 17, at 250-52; David
W. Rivkin & Frances L. Kellner, In Support of the F.A.A.: An Argument Against US.
Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 535, 536 (1990). Even
commentators advocating adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law as federal law
acknowledge that the FAA "functions well." Kolkey, supra note 17, at 492. Since the
FAA provides an effective legal framework for the enforcement of international
arbitration agreements and the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral
awards, the Washington Foreign Law Society Report states that it is unrealistic to expect
Congress to repeal the FAA and to enact the UNCITRAL Model Law in its entirety. See
Washington Foreign Law Society Report, supra, at 311.
Moreover, the author chooses not to evaluate proposed amendments to the FAA
of specific provisions designed to clarify matters viewed as important to international
arbitration and not included in the FAA. Other commentators recommend amendments
to the FAA to address perceived deficiencies in federal law, but they do not advocate
that federal law should apply exclusively to international commercial arbitrations. See
id. at 311-16 (recommending amendment to the FAA following the substance of
provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law concerning interim measures of protection
ordered by a court, challenges of arbitrators, tribunal authority to name the place of
arbitration if the parties have not done so, and rules applicable to the substance of the
dispute); New York City Bar Report, supra note 17, at 256-57 (recommending
amendments to the FAA similar to UNCITRAL Model Law provisions concerning
venue selection and interim measures of protection ordered by a court).
Furthermore, while generally taking a favorable view toward existing state
international arbitration statutes, this article does not attempt to formulate a
recommendation concerning whether state international arbitration legislation patterned
after the UNCITRAL Model Law or some other design is the most effective approach
for future state legislation. However, in part III, when comparing provisions in the FAA
with those contained in selected state international arbitration statutes to determine the
extent of FAA preemption of state law provisions, the author will describe the varying
approaches to particular matters taken by different state international arbitration statutes,
and in certain instances, the possible benefits of a particular provision or approach.
28 In his comprehensive study of national arbitration laws, Dr. J. Gillis Wetter
delineates the subject areas and general characteristics that define the scope of a properly
drafted national arbitration act. See J. Gillis Wetter, The Proper Scope of a National
Arbitration Act, 5 INT'L ARB. REP. 17 (1990). While Wetter does not articulate
specifically the proper scope of the national and local arbitration laws that may exist
within a federal state, Wetter does suggest that both federal and local arbitration laws
can create an effective environment for the conduct of international commercial
arbitrations conducted within a federal state. See id. at 25. A determination of the
subject areas applicable to international arbitration that national and local laws within a
federal state should address would appear to require a comprehensive comparative study
such as completed by Wetter. The author views a comparative study of arbitration laws
as of limited value in assessing the appropriate scope of the U.S. state international
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This article seeks to dispel the fears of commentators who
argue for amendment of the FAA to preempt state international
arbitration statutes based on their belief that state international
arbitration statutes create significant uncertainty concerning
whether federal or state law applies to international arbitrations
conducted in the United States." Part II discusses the applicability
of provisions in state international arbitration statutes. This part
reveals that such state statutory provisions only apply (1) when
provisions in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA do not preempt such state
statutory provisions or (2) when the arbitration agreement or
arbitral award does not fall within the scope of the FAA's chapter
1 or 2 but is within the scope of the state international arbitration
statute.
Part HI examines provisions primarily in three state
international arbitration statutes representative of the different
state law approaches.3" The analysis in this part demonstrates that
arbitration statutes since the interrelationship between national and local law and the
applicable judicial precedents within other federal states may differ significantly from
their United States counterparts.
29See supra note 26 for the views of commentators professing that state
international arbitration statutes create sufficient uncertainty regarding whether the FAA
or state international arbitration acts may apply to warrant amendment of the FAA
preempting state international arbitration statutes.
3 0 Comparison and analysis of provisions contained in the ten state international
arbitration statutes presently enacted is beyond the scope of this study. For a
comprehensive study of provisions contained in state international arbitration statutes,
see generally, George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International
Arbitrations, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419 (1992). In his 1992 study, Walker
examines provisions in all state international arbitration statutes presently enacted,
except for the Ohio international arbitration legislation, which went into effect on
October 23, 1991. See id. In part III, the author chooses to examine primarily
provisions in the state international arbitration legislation enacted in California, Florida,
and Georgia, which each adopt distinct approaches. The California international
arbitration statute follows to a great extent provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law.
State international arbitration statutes also containing provisions closely following the
UNCITRAL Model Law include Connecticut, Texas, Oregon, North Carolina, and Ohio.
Thus, California is representative of those state international arbitration statutes Walker
defines as self-contained legislation, separate and distinct from the state's code sections
applicable to domestic arbitrations, which largely follow the UNCITRAL Model Law.
See id. at 423. The Florida International Arbitration Act is the most comprehensive
statute included in the group of self-contained legislation not generally following the
Model Law. See id. Walker also includes the Hawaii state legislation in this group. See
id. However, the Florida statute is more comprehensive in scope than the Hawaii statute
making provisions in the Florida statute more appropriate for comparing with the
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few provisions in state international arbitration statutes conflict
directly with provisions in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA or undermine
the purposes or policies of the FAA or the New York Convention.
These results suggest that the extent of preemption of provisions in
state international arbitration statutes is not significant.
Part IV argues that the Volt decision has not had the negative
impact feared by its critics. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court limited the potential negative
implications of Volt when the Court held that a standard choice of
law clause selecting state law is not sufficient to indicate the
parties' intent to apply state arbitration law that the FAA would
otherwise preempt. Moreover, Mastrobuono suggests that state
arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA may only apply to an
arbitration if the parties include in their contract a choice of law
clause that expressly selects state law over federal law.
Part V concludes that there is not sufficient uncertainty
concerning whether federal or state statutory provisions apply to
warrant an amendment to the FAA preempting state international
arbitration statutes. The author bases this conclusion on the
following findings of this study: (1) state international arbitration
act provisions only apply when the FAA does not preempt such
comprehensive California legislation, which follows to a great extent the UNCITRAL
Model Law. The Georgia statutory provisions specifically supplement Georgia's
domestic arbitration code. The author chooses to compare the pertinent Georgia
statutory provisions with those in the California and Florida statutes, since the language
contained in the Georgia statutory provisions in many cases differs from provisions in
corresponding sections of the California and Florida statutes. The state international
arbitration legislation enacted in Maryland does not fall under one of the three
approaches of which the California, Florida, and Georgia statutes are representative.
The Maryland legislation includes few significant provisions. It appears that the
purpose of the Maryland legislation is to clarify that federal law applies to the conduct
of international commercial arbitrations and the enforcement of international arbitral
awards in Maryland. Section 3-2B-03 of the Maryland statute declares that "[i]n all
matters relating to the process and enforcement of international commercial arbitration
and awards, the laws of Maryland shall be the arbitration statutes and laws of the United
States." MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PROC. § 3-2B-03 (1995). While part III will
focus primarily on provisions contained in the California, Florida, and Georgia statutes,
the author will address provisions in state international arbitration statutes patterned
after the UNCITRAL Model Law if such provisions differ significantly from the
corresponding provision in the California statute or are not included in the California
statute.
31115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
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provisions or when the arbitration agreement or arbitral award falls
outside of the scope of chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA; (2) few state
international arbitration act provisions conflict with specific FAA
provisions or undermine the purposes or policies of the FAA or the
New York Convention; and (3) the Supreme Court's holding in
Mastrobuono clarifies the uncertainties created by the Volt
decision. Moreover, in part V, the author opposes amending the
FAA to preempt state international arbitration statutes, since such
an amendment to the FAA would limit parties in their choice of
the legal framework applicable to an international arbitration
conducted in the United States.
II. The Applicability of State International Arbitration
Statutes
Many of the state international arbitration statutes do not
expressly recognize the predominant role played by the FAA in
governing international commercial arbitrations conducted within
the particular state.32 Critics of state international arbitration
32For example, the California statute applies to international commercial
arbitration "subject to any agreement which is in force between the United States and
any other state or states." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.11 (West 1996). State
international arbitration statutes largely following the UNCITRAL Model Law also
contain this provision. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-101(l) (West 1994); OIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2712.02(A) (Banks-Baldwin, WESTLAW through 1996 portion of
121st G.A.); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.454(1) (1995); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
172.001(a) (West Supp. 1996). The Florida International Arbitration Act does not
recognize the supremacy of the New York Convention, the Inter-American Convention,
or federal law. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 648.03 (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd
Reg. Sess.). However, an account of the legislative history of the Florida International
Arbitration Act by one of its drafters indicates that the Florida statute was intended to
apply to arbitration agreements and arbitral awards not governed by the New York
Convention, the Inter-American Convention, or the FAA. See Carlos E. Loumiet,
Introductory Note: Florida International Arbitration Act, 26 I.L.M. 949, 957 n.10
(1987) [hereinafter Loumiet, Introduction to Florida Act]. In addition, the portion of the
Georgia arbitration statute relevant to international arbitration does not expressly
recognize the supremacy of the conventions or federal law. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-
30-9-9-43 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.). However, one state international arbitration
statute does expressly recognize the supremacy of the conventions and the FAA.
Section 1-567.31 (a) of the North Carolina statute declares that "[t]his Article applies to
international commercial arbitration, subject to any applicable international agreement in
force between the United States of America and any other nation or nations, or any
federal statute." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.31(a) (1996). The Maryland statute contains
a provision that adopts federal law as the international arbitration law of Maryland.
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statutes profess that the failure of such state legislation to declare
specifically that FAA provisions control over state law provisions
and that the state legislation serves to supplement the FAA could
mislead foreign parties who may believe that state arbitration law
primarily governs international arbitration conducted in the United
States.33 Critics contend that this confusion could decrease the
attractiveness of states that have enacted state international
arbitration statutes as places for international arbitration."
While declarations in state international arbitration statutes
recognizing the supremacy of the FAA are preferable, such
declarations do not help clarify the specific circumstances under
which provisions in state international arbitration statutes may
apply. As discussed in parts II and III of this article, provisions in
state international arbitration statutes may apply primarily in the
following situations: (1) if an action is brought in state court
pursuant to a state international arbitration statute with regard to
an arbitration agreement or arbitral award within the scope of
chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA, then provisions in the state international
arbitration statute may apply to the extent that such provisions do
not conflict with the corresponding provisions in the FAA's
chapter 1 or 2, or do not undermine the purposes or policies of the
FAA or the New York Convention;35 or (2) if an arbitration
agreement or arbitral award does not fall within the scope of the
FAA, then provisions in a state international arbitration statute
may apply if the arbitration agreement or arbitral award is within
the scope of the state statute.36
Section 3-2B-03(a) of the Maryland statute provides that "[i]n all matters relating to the
process and enforcement of international commercial arbitration and awards, the laws of
Maryland shall be the arbitration statutes and laws of the United States." MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROc. § 3-2B-03(a).
33See McClendon, supra note 17, at 259; New York City Bar Report, supra note
17, at 260.
34See, e.g., McClendon, supra note 17, at 259.
35See infra notes 32-246 and accompanying text. Moreover, part IV contends
that state international arbitration act provisions inconsistent with chapter 1 or 2 of the
FAA may apply to an arbitration agreement or arbitral award within the scope of chapter
1 or 2 of the FAA only if the parties include in their contract a choice of law clause that
selects expressly such state law over federal law. See infra notes 271-72 and 274 and
accompanying text.
36One commentator also suggests that provisions in state international
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This part attempts to delineate the circumstances when
provisions in state international arbitration statutes may apply.
The author will discuss those arbitration agreements contained in
contracts involving the foreign or interstate commerce of the
United States subject to chapter 1 of the FAA.37 While provisions
in state international arbitration statutes may apply to arbitration
agreements falling within the scope of the FAA's chapter 1 as well
as to arbitral awards resulting from such arbitration agreements,
the FAA may preempt state international arbitration act provisions
to the extent that such state statutory provisions conflict directly
with a provision in the FAA's chapter 1 or undermine the purposes
or policies of the FAA.38 This part also discusses when provisions
in state international arbitration statutes may apply if an arbitration
agreement or arbitral award is not within the scope of chapter 1 of
the FAA.39
arbitration statutes may also apply in federal court actions under certain circumstances.
Walker professes that federal courts should apply state international arbitration statutes
in two situations that require the application of state law. First, Walker cites the
situation where federal law requires the application of state law such as under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Walker, supra note 30, at 457. For example,
Walker notes that if no federal statute applies, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64
requires a United States district court to apply state law pre-judgment remedies for the
seizure of property. See id. at 457 n. 170. Walker comments that this provision allows a
federal district court to hear requests for interim measures of protection as provided for
in state international arbitration statutes. See id. Second, Walker states that a federal
court should apply a state international arbitration statute when the outcome-
determinative principle requires that state law apply in a diversity case in federal court.
See id. at 457-58.
37 Chapter I of the FAA contains provisions addressing matters important to the
conduct of international arbitrations conducted in the United States, such as court
intervention to enforce agreements to arbitrate as well as the confirmation or vacation of
arbitral awards made in the United States. Since state international arbitration statutes
primarily concern international arbitrations conducted in the particular state or the
confirmation of international arbitral awards rendered in the respective state, articulating
the scope of chapter 1 of the FAA is essential to determine the applicability of numerous
provisions in state international arbitration statutes.
38 Part II discusses the circumstances under which provisions in state
international arbitration statutes may apply. See infra notes 43-78 and accompanying
text. However, part II does not specifically address the extent of FAA preemption of
provisions in state international arbitration statutes. Part III examines whether the FAA
preempts the application of particular provisions in state international arbitration statutes
with regard to arbitration agreements covered by the FAA. See infra notes 79-246 and
accompanying text.
39See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, this part will describe those international
arbitrations conducted in the United States that may result in
"nondomestic" awards subject to the New York Convention. Such
nondomestic awards are within the scope of the FAA's chapter 2,
which implements the United States' obligations under the New
York Convention. Provisions in state international arbitration
statutes may apply to confirm or vacate nondomestic awards
subject to the FAA's chapter 2 as well as to enforce arbitration
agreements that could result in such a nondomestic award, unless
corresponding provisions in the FAA's chapter 2 preempt such
state law provisionsi0
Furthermore, this part will discuss briefly foreign arbitral
awards rendered abroad that fall within the scope of the New York
Convention as ratified by the United States. As discussed in part
III, state international arbitration act provisions that expressly
provide grounds for refusing the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards may apply to foreign arbitral awards subject to the New
York Convention to the extent that the pertinent provision in
chapter 2 of the FAA does not preempt such state statutory
provisions. In addition, state international arbitration act
provisions that concern the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
apply to those foreign arbitral awards not subject to the New York
Convention.42
Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
regard to matters arising from an arbitration agreement that falls
within the scope of chapter 1 of the FAA.43 Sections 1 and 2 of the
FAA's chapter 1 provide for the enforceability of arbitration
4 For discussion concerning whether section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 may
preempt state international arbitration act provisions invoked to confirm or vacate a
nondomestic award, see infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text. For discussion
concerning whether section 206 of the FAA's chapter 2 may preempt state international
arbitration act provisions invoked to enforce an arbitration agreement that could result in
a nondomestic award, see infra note 118.
41 For discussion concerning whether section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 may
preempt state international arbitration act provisions that provide grounds for refusing
enforcement to foreign arbitral awards, see infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 74 and 76-77 and accompanying text.
43Chapter 1 of the FAA does not create an independent basis for federal
question jurisdiction. See BoRN, supra note 6, at 436.
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agreements contained in contracts evidencing a transaction
involving the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States."
The Supreme Court has held that section 2 of the FAA, which
specifically provides for the enforceability of arbitration
agreements satisfying the "commerce" requirement, applies in
both federal and state courts.45  While the FAA provides
procedures applicable in federal courts, it is unclear whether FAA
provisions other than section 2 apply in state court actions
involving an arbitration agreement satisfying the "commerce"
requirement and thus falling within the scope of chapter 1 of the
FAA."
Section 1 of the FAA's chapter 1 defines commerce as
"commerce among the several states or with foreign nations. 4 7
Courts have interpreted the foreign commerce requirement
broadly. Contracts between a U.S. corporation or U.S. national
and a foreign corporation negotiated in a foreign country and
performed in that country are transactions involving "commerce
with foreign nations" pursuant to section 1 of the FAA's chapter
1.48
"See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
45See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Supreme Court has
also held that section 2 of the FAA creates federal substantive law favoring the
enforceability of arbitration agreements which applies in both federal and state courts.
See id. at 16.
'For example, it is not clear whether sections 3 and 4 of the FAA apply in state
courts. Section 3 provides that the "courts of the United States" may stay actions before
them with regard to issues referable to arbitration under a written arbitration agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 4 allows any "United States district court" to compel arbitration in
accordance with the terms of a written arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4. As a result
of the failure of sections 3 and 4 to apply expressly to state courts, lower courts have
reached different results concerning whether sections 3 and 4 of the FAA apply in state
courts. See BORN, supra note 6, at 229-30, 439, 446. In addition, the Supreme Court
has not clarified whether sections 3 and 4 of the FAA are applicable in state courts. In
Volt, the Supreme Court declared that while "the FAA's 'substantive' provisions - §§ I
and 2 - are applicable in state as well as federal court, we have never held that §§ 3 and
4, which by their terms appear to apply only in proceedings in federal court.., are
nonetheless applicable in state court." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) (citations omitted).
479 U.S.C. § 1.
"See Al-Salamah Arabian Agencies Co. v. Reece, 673 F. Supp. 748, 750
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (marketing services contract to sell insurance in Saudi Arabia between
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"Commerce with foreign nations" requires a U.S. nexus.49
Courts have held that commerce between foreign nations which is
without a sufficient U.S. nexus does not constitute "commerce
with foreign nations" pursuant to section 1 of the FAA.5" For
example, an international contract of sale between a United States
corporation and a foreign corporation would have a sufficient U.S.
nexus to satisfy the "commerce with foreign nations" requirement
of the FAA's chapter 1." On the other hand, an international
contract of sale between two non-U.S. corporations in which a
U.S. corporation acted as an agent on behalf of one of the non-U.S.
contracting parties would not appear to have a sufficient U.S.
nexus to constitute "commerce with foreign nations" pursuant to
U.S. national and Saudi Arabian insurance company entered into in Saudi Arabia is a
transaction involving foreign commerce pursuant to section 1 of the FAA); Pioneer
Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-64 (D. Kan. 1983) (joint venture
agreement involving use of U.S. corporation's money by Canadian corporation to
develop and manage Canadian real estate, where joint venture agreement negotiated in
Canada, was a transaction involving foreign commerce for purposes of section 1 of
FAA); El Hoss Eng'g & Trans. Co. v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 394, 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (contract between U.S. corporation and Lebanese corporation for sale
and leasing of automotive and construction equipment and rendering transportation
required by U.S. corporation, where contract negotiated and performed in Kuwait,
constitutes a transaction involving foreign commerce pursuant to section 1 of the FAA).
49 See, e.g., Reynolds Jamaica Mines, Ltd. v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 239
F.2d 689, 693 (4th Cir. 1956) (contract for sale of ship between U.S. corporate buyer
and French corporate seller, where Panamanian corporation created to hold title to ship
while U.S. corporation remains liable for purchase price and continues as beneficiary
under contract, was not a transaction "between two foreign nations," but rather was a
contract made by a U.S. corporation with a foreign corporation, and, thus was a
transaction involving commerce "with a foreign country" pursuant to section 1 of the
FAA).
50See Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp.
359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (contracts for purchase and sale of sugar on London
Commodities Exchange entered into by U.S. corporation on behalf of Italian citizen,
who was a sole stockholder of a Panamanian corporation having its principal office in
Switzerland, at Paris office of U.S. corporation engaged in brokerage and investment
business were not transactions involving "commerce with foreign nations" pursuant to
section 1 of FAA); Petroleum Cargo Carriers, Ltd. v. Unitas, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 724,
727 (1961) (assignment of rights under a shipbuilding contract where assignee was
Liberian, buyer was Panamanian, shipbuilder was Japanese, and goods purchased
pursuant to assignment agreement manufactured in Germany, constitutes commerce
between foreign countries but does not satisfy requirement of "commerce with foreign
nations" pursuant to section 1 of FAA).
51 For case law following this example, see supra note 49.
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section 1 of the FAA's chapter 152
Most international contracts containing agreements to arbitrate
in the United States will satisfy the definition of foreign commerce
under section 1 of the FAA's chapter 1.53 An international
arbitration agreement included in a contract evidencing a
transaction involving interstate commerce also falls within the
scope of chapter 1 of the FAA. Such a transaction involving
interstate commerce could include business dealings that implicate
two or more U.S. states and that concern one U.S. party and one
foreign party or two foreign parties." For example, a contract of
sale between two non-U.S. corporations in which the foreign
corporate seller sends goods from its factory in Wisconsin to the
foreign corporate buyer at the buyer's factory in Illinois would
involve interstate commerce. Thus, the arbitration agreement
contained in the parties' contract would fall within the scope of
chapter 1 of the FAA.
As discussed in this part and developed further in part III,
provisions in state international arbitration statutes may apply to
an arbitration arising from an arbitration agreement within the
scope of chapter 1 of the FAA to the extent that such state
statutory provisions do not conflict directly with provisions in the
FAA's chapter 1 or do not undermine the purposes or policies of
the FAA's chapter 1.55 However, if the arbitration agreement does
not fall within the scope of chapter 1 of the FAA, then provisions
in a state international arbitration statute may apply when the
arbitration agreement is within the scope of the particular state
52 For case law following this example, see supra note 50.
53See BoRN, supra note 6, at 436-37.
54It would appear that the provisions of chapter 1 of the FAA might not apply to
an international arbitration arising from an arbitration agreement consented to by two
foreign parties included in a transaction involving interstate commerce if such an
arbitration agreement would result in a "nondomestic" award under the New York
Convention. Section 208 of the FAA's chapter 2 states that provisions in chapter 1 of
the FAA may apply to the extent that chapter 1 provisions do not conflict with
provisions in chapter 2 or the New York Convention as ratified by the U.S. See 9
U.S.C. § 208 (1994).
55part III discusses the extent of FAA preemption of particular provisions
contained in state international arbitration statutes. See infra notes 79-246 and
accompanying text.
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statute. If an arbitration agreement falls within the scope of a state
international arbitration statute but is outside of the scope of
chapter 1 of the FAA, then the FAA's chapter 1 cannot preempt
the pertinent state statutory provisions."
By their terms, state international arbitration statutes apply to
arbitration agreements contained in contracts evidencing
transactions involving the foreign or interstate commerce of the
United States. 7 However, provisions addressing the applicability
of state international arbitration statutes also appear to allow the
application of such state statutes to international arbitration
agreements that do not satisfy the foreign or interstate commerce
requirement and, therefore, do not fall within the scope of chapter
1 of the FAA. In the paragraphs that follow, this part will address
the applicability of selected state international arbitration statutes
to those arbitration agreements that are not within the scope of
chapter 1 of the FAA.58
Provisions in state international arbitration statutes appear to
allow the application of such state statutes to international
arbitrations between either a U.S. party and a foreign party or two
foreign parties when the underlying transaction does not have a
56The Washington Foreign Law Society Report comments that state law would
"apply exclusively to those few international arbitrations taking place in the United
States to which the FAA does not apply." Washington Foreign Law Society Report,
supra note 27, at 324. The Washington Foreign Law Society cites as an example of an
international arbitration conducted in the U.S. not subject to chapter 1 of the FAA as a
dispute between two foreign parties not involving interstate commerce. See id.
57For example, the California international arbitration statute applies to
arbitrations conducted in California if the parties to an arbitration have places of
business in different states (nations) at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration
agreement. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.12, 1297.13(a) (West 1996). This
provision appears to apply to arbitration agreements that satisfy the foreign or interstate
commerce requirement as well as to arbitration agreements that do not fall within the
scope of chapter 1 of the FAA.
"This part discusses provisions contained in international arbitration legislation
enacted in California, Florida, and Georgia, which suggest the applicability of such state
statutes to arbitration agreements that are not within the scope of chapter 1 of the FAA.
The author selects provisions in the California, Florida, and Georgia statutes for
analysis, since these statutes are representative of the different state law approaches
among the ten state international arbitration statutes presently enacted. For further
discussion concerning the California, Florida, and Georgia statutes as representative of
the different state law approaches, see supra note 30.
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sufficient U.S. nexus to constitute a transaction involving the
foreign or interstate commerce of the United States pursuant to
section 1 of the FAA's chapter 1. The California international
arbitration statute deems an arbitration agreement "international"
for the purposes of the statute, if any of the following occurs:
(1) the parties to the arbitration have places of business in different
states; (2) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter
of the arbitration agreement relates to commercial interests in
more than one state; or (3) the subject matter of the arbitration
agreement is otherwise related to commercial interests in more
than one state. 9 These provisions appear to allow the application
of the California international arbitration statute to arbitrations
conducted in California when the underlying transaction does not
have a sufficient U.S. nexus to constitute a transaction involving
the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States. 6 For
example, the California international arbitration statute would
apply to an arbitration conducted in California involving an
international contract of sale between parties from France and
Spain in which the underlying transaction has no contacts with the
United States. Although not suggesting particular circumstances
when their state statutes may apply to an arbitration agreement
outside the scope of chapter 1 of the FAA, provisions in the
Florida International Arbitration Act and the Georgia Code also
authorize the application of their respective state statutes to
arbitrations between either a U.S. party and a foreign party or two
foreign parties when the underlying transaction does not involve
59See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.13(a), (c), (d). While section 1297.13(c)
provides that an arbitration agreement is "international" for the purposes of the
California statute if the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the
arbitration agreement relates to commercial interests in more than one state, it is
questionable whether a California court would deem an arbitration agreement
"international" pursuant to section 1297.13(c) if such a statement of the parties was
fraudulent.
601n order for the California international arbitration statute to apply to an
arbitration conducted in California, the arbitration agreement must be "international"
pursuant to section 1297.13 as well as arise out of a commercial relationship pursuant to
section 1297.16. Note that section 1297.16 includes a nonexclusive list of what may
constitute such a commercial relationship. In addition, the California international
arbitration statute only applies to arbitrations conducted in California. See CAL. CiV.
PROC. CODE § 1297.12.
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the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States."
Article I(1) of the New York Convention provides in part that
the Convention applies to arbitral awards "not considered as
domestic awards in the State [nation] where recognition and
enforcement are sought."62 United States courts have held that an
arbitration between two foreign parties conducted in the United
States pursuant to United States arbitration law may result in a
"nondomestic" award subject to the New York Convention and the
FAA's chapter 2. For example, the Second Circuit has held that
an arbitration between Swiss and Norwegian parties conducted in
New York pursuant to United States arbitration law resulted in a
"nondomestic" arbitral award within the meaning of the New York
Convention.63  One must question whether such U.S. court
decisions represent enlightened policy, since such decisions appear
to conflict with the meaning of nondomestic award intended by the
drafters of the New York Convention. 64
61 Section 684.03 of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides that the
Florida act applies to arbitrations between "two or more persons at least one of whom is
a nonresident of the United States." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.03(la) (West, WESTLAW
through 1996 2nd Reg. Sess.). Section 9-9-31 (b)(1) of the Georgia Code provides that
part 2 of the Georgia arbitration legislation, which pertains to international arbitration,
applies to the arbitration of disputes between "two or more persons at least one of whom
is domiciled or established outside of the United States." GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3 l(b)(1)
(LEXIS through 1996 Supp.).
62New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). The New York Convention
does not define "nondomestic" awards subject to the Convention. One commentator has
noted that "[t]he question of what constitutes a non-domestic award within the meaning
of the New York Convention is one of the most complicated issues posed by this
Treaty." Albert van den Berg, When is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New
York Convention of 1958?, 6 PACE L. REv. 25, 26 (1985).
63 See Bergeson v. Joseph Miller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983). Other
lower United States courts have agreed with the Bergeson decision. See Dworkin-Cosell
Interair Courier Servs., Inc. v. Avraham, 728 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Transmarine Seaways Corp. v. Marc Rich & Co., AG, 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). Born comments that no reported decision subsequent to Bergeson has held that
an arbitral award made in the United States cannot constitute a nondomestic award
subject to the New York Convention. See BORN, supra note 6, at 477.
64The Bergeson decision would appear to conflict with the meaning of
nondomestic award intended by the drafters of the New York Convention. The
legislative history of the New York Convention indicates that the drafters intended that
arbitrations conducted within a contracting state pursuant to another nation's arbitration
law would result in nondomestic awards under the Convention. See id. at 479. For
example, an arbitration between two Germans conducted in Germany pursuant to
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An arbitration between two United States parties conducted in
the United States may result in a "nondomestic" award under the
New York Convention as long as the underlying transaction "has a
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states."65  State
international arbitration statutes also contain provisions allowing
application of the state statute to arbitrations between two or more
United States parties with regard to disputes related to property,
contractual performance, or other matters occurring outside the
United States.66
State international arbitration act provisions that authorize state
courts to vacate arbitral awards rendered within the particular state
may apply to awards deemed nondomestic within the meaning of
the New York Convention, unless section 207 of the FAA's
chapter 2 preempts such a state statutory provision.67 In addition,
state international arbitration act provisions authorizing state
courts to issue orders to compel arbitration may apply to an
arbitration agreement that may result in a nondomestic award
subject to the New York *Convention, unless section 206 of the
FAA's chapter 2 preempts the pertinent state statutory provision.68
English arbitration law would result in a nondomestic award within the meaning of term
as intended by the Convention's drafters. See id. van den Berg professes that neither
the text or legislative history of either the New York Convention nor the FAA's chapter
2 support the Second Circuit's decision in Bergeson. See van den Berg, supra note 62,
at 50.
65 BORN, supra note 6, at 480. Section 202 of the FAA's chapter 2 provides that
"an agreement or award arising out of such a [commercial] relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention
unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states." 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). Born comments that United States courts have not
clearly articulated the scope of the "reasonable relationship" standard under section 202
as well as the scope of awards rendered in the United States deemed nondomestic under
section 202. See BORN, supra note 6, at 480.
66See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.13(b) (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 684.03(1)(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-31 (b)(2).
67Specifically, section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 will preempt state law
provisions that provide a broader basis to vacate an award than provided in Article V of
the New York Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 207. For further discussion concerning the
extent that section 207 may preempt state international arbitration act provisions that
specify the grounds a state court may invoke to vacate a nondomestic award, see infra
notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
68 Arbitration agreements falling under the New York Convention appear limited
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Article 1(1) of the New York Convention provides in part that
the Convention applies to arbitral awards "made in the territory of
a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought."69  Article 1(3) of the New York
Convention allows a State, when signing, ratifying, or acceding to
the Convention, to declare that the State will apply the Convention
"on the basis of reciprocity" such that the State's courts will only
recognize or enforce foreign arbitral awards made "in the territory
of another Contracting State. 70 When ratifying the New York
Convention, the United States deposited a reciprocity reservation
providing that the United States will "apply the Convention, on the
basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only
those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State."'
'
Thus, courts in the United States may only apply the New York
Convention to recognize or enforce foreign arbitral awards made
in nations that are contracting parties to the Convention. 72  For
to arbitration agreements that would result in awards enforceable in the United States
under the Convention, because such awards are made in a country that is a signatory to
the Convention or such awards are considered as "nondomestic" by United States courts.
See BORN, supra note 6, at 291. State international arbitration statutes may apply to
arbitration agreements that may result in a "nondomestic" award under the New York
Convention. However, state international arbitration statutes do not contain provisions
that enforce agreements to arbitrate abroad. Thus, it appears that section 206 of the
FAA's chapter 2 could only preempt state international arbitration act provisions
authorizing state courts to issue orders compelling arbitration in circumstances involving
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that may result in nondomestic award under
the New York Convention.
69New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). In this context, "State" refers to
a contracting party to the Ndw York Convention and not to a constituent state of the
United States.
70 d. art. 1(3).
719 U.S.C.A. § 201. Section 304 of the FAA's chapter 3 contains a reciprocity
requirement similar to the U.S. reciprocity reservation to the New York Convention.
Section 304 provides that arbitral awards made in the territory of a foreign state may be
recognized and enforced pursuant to chapter 3 only if the foreign state has ratified or
acceded to the Inter-American Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 304.
72As of January 1, 1996, 109 nations were parties to the New York Convention.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 316 (1996). United States courts have
applied the Convention's Article II in order to "refer" parties to arbitration in a signatory
nation to the Convention. See BORN, supra note 6, at 290-91. Since state international
arbitration statutes do not contain provisions that enforce agreements to arbitrate abroad,
this study will not discuss the extent that provisions in the New York Convention or the
FAA's chapter 2 may apply to agreements to arbitrate outside of the United States.
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example, pursuant to the New York Convention, courts in the
United States must recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in
France, a contracting party to the Convention.
All state international arbitration statutes acknowledge either
expressly or implicitly that their respective state courts must
recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards rendered in countries
that are contracting parties to the New York and Inter-American
Conventions, subject to specified grounds for refusing such
enforcement.73 However, four state statutes contain specific
provisions that expressly allow their respective state courts to
recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards made in countries
that are not contracting parties to the New York or Inter-American
Conventions.74
73 Both the North Carolina and Maryland statutes provide expressly that their
respective state courts may only enforce arbitral awards to the extent authorized by the
New York and Inter-American Conventions as well as federal law. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-567.65 (1996); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-03, 04 (1995). The
statutes enacted in Florida, Connecticut, Oregon, and Georgia contain provisions that
expressly allow their respective state courts to enforce arbitral awards .regardless of the
country where the award was made. See infra note 74 and accompanying text for
discussion concerning these state statutory provisions. The California, Hawaii, and Ohio
statutes contain provisions that acknowledge the application of provisions in their state
statute is subject to the New York and Inter-American Conventions. See supra note 32.
This recognition of the supremacy of the New York and Inter-American Conventions
implies that their respective state courts would recognize and enforce only those foreign
arbitral awards rendered in countries that are contracting parties to the New York and
Inter-American Conventions. A provision in the Georgia Code recognizes the Georgia
courts will recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards subject to the New York and
Inter-American Conventions as well as appears to allow Georgia courts to recognize and
enforce foreign arbitral awards made in countries that are not contracting parties to the
New York or Inter-American Conventions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-42 (LEXIS
through 1996 Supp.). For discussion of the Georgia Code provision that concerns the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by Georgia courts, see infra note 74. The Florida
International Arbitration Act fails to expressly recognize the supremacy of the
Conventions or the FAA. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 648.03 (West, WESTLAW through
1996 2nd Reg. Sess.); supra note 32.
14 Section 684.24(1)(a) of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides that
a Florida court may confirm an award "without regard to the place of arbitration." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 684.24(1)(a). The Connecticut and Oregon statutes authorize their
respective state courts to enforce a foreign arbitral award "irrespective of the country in
which it was made." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-135 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.522 (1995). While section 9-9-42 of the Georgia Code appears to authorize
Georgia courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards made in countries that
are not contracting parties to the New York or Inter-American Conventions, the
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State international arbitration act provisions that authorize their
state. courts to refuse the recognition or enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards may apply to foreign arbitral awards subject to the
New York Convention, unless section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2,
which incorporates by reference the grounds specified in the
Convention's Article V for refusing the recognition or
enforcement of Convention awards, preempts such a state law
provision.75  On the other hand, state international arbitration act
provisions may apply to grant or deny enforcement to foreign
arbitral awards rendered in nations not contracting parties to the
New York Convention.76 Such a state statutory provision may
apply to a foreign arbitral award not subject to the Convention to
the extent that such a foreign award falls within the scope of the
state international arbitration statute. For example, a Connecticut
state court could invoke the Connecticut statutory provision
authorizing its state courts to enforce a foreign arbitral award
"irrespective of the country in which it was made" in order to
enforce an award rendered in Brazil, which is not a contracting
language of the provision is not entirely clear. Section 9-9-42 entitled "Reciprocity in
Recognition and Enforcement of an Award" provides in pertinent part that "an
arbitration award irrespective of where it was made, on the basis of reciprocity, shall be
recognized as binding and shall be enforceable in the courts of this state ....
Reciprocity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards shall be in
accordance with applicable federal laws, international conventions, and treaties." GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-42. This provision is less than clear since enforcing arbitral awards
irrespective of the country where they were made goes beyond the requirements of the
New York and Inter-American Conventions, which allow only the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards rendered in countries that are contracting parties to the
Conventions.
75See BORN, supra note 6, at 659. Section 207 provides in part that a court with
jurisdiction under the FAA's chapter 2 "shall confirm" a Convention award unless one
of the grounds for refusing the recognition or enforcement of the award applies. 9
U.S.C. § 207. While the literal language of section 207 authorizes the court to
"confirm" a Convention award, Born professes that "section 207 imposes a general
obligation to enforce arbitral awards, subject to the Convention's eight exceptions to
enforceability." BORN, supra note 6, at 659. For discussion concerning the extent that
section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 may preempt state international arbitration act
provisions that authorize their respective state courts to refuse the recognition or
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, see infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
76Thus, a state court, invoking its state's international arbitration act provision,
may enforce foreign arbitral awards rendered in the more than 100 countries that are not
parties to the New York Convention. Such foreign awards are not enforceable by courts
in the United States under the Convention.
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party to the New York Convention."
The foregoing analysis reveals that provisions in state
international arbitration statutes apply exclusively to those
international agreements to arbitrate in the United States,
international arbitral awards rendered in the United States, and
foreign arbitral awards not subject to chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA, as
well as within the scope of the state international arbitration
statute. If an arbitration agreement or arbitral award falls within
the scope of the FAA's chapter 1 or 2, then state international
arbitration act provisions may apply only to the extent that the
FAA does not preempt such state statutory provisions. 8
Moreover, as developed in part III, in cases where state court
actions involve international arbitration agreements or
international arbitral awards within the scope of the FAA's chapter
1 or 2, the extent of preemption of state international arbitration
act provisions is not significant since few provisions in state
international arbitration statutes conflict directly with provisions in
chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA or undermine the purposes or policies of
the FAA or the New York Convention.
III. Analysis of Preemption of Provisions in State
International Arbitration Statutes
If a state court action pursuant to a state international
arbitration statute pertains to an arbitration agreement or arbitral
award within the scope of chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA, then relevant
provisions of the state international arbitration statute may apply
to the extent the FAA does not preempt such provisions. Whether
"See supra note 74 for discussion of the Connecticut and other state statutory
provisions that expressly allow their respective state courts to recognize and enforce
foreign arbitral awards made in countries that are not contracting parties to the New
York Convention. As of January 1, 1996, Brazil was not a contracting party to the New
York Convention. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 308 (1996).
78 In addition, provisions in state international arbitration statutes apply primarily
in state court actions. In many cases involving international arbitral agreements or
awards, parties can avoid the applicability of provisions in state international arbitration
statutes by suing in federal court. See Washington Foreign Law Society Report, supra
note 27, at 324. However, federal courts would not have jurisdiction over an action
stemming from an arbitration between two foreign parties in which the underlying
transaction does not involve the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States. See
id.
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federal law preempts state law in a particular case is to a great
extent a question of statutory construction." While the Supreme
Court has addressed questions concerning whether the FAA may
preempt a particular provision of a state arbitration law, the Court
has not decided a case involving the interaction of the FAA and a
state international arbitration statute."0
The Supreme Court has held that the FAA may preempt state
arbitration law "to the extent that it [state law] actually conflicts
with federal law--that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."'8 A court may invalidate a state law that
interferes with the fulfillment of the purposes and objectives of the
federal law if the state law is in "actual conflict" with the
substantive operation of the federal law." "Actual conflict"
between federal and state legislation may exist in two
circumstances: (1) when federal and state legislation are directly
contradictory on their face; or (2) when federal and state laws are
not contradictory on their face, but state legislation frustrates the
narrow objectives of the federal legislation. 3
This part analyzes preemption issues that appear important
within the context of the coexistence of the New York Convention,
chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA, and state international arbitration
79 LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (1988).
8 The FAA preemption cases decided by the Court have involved state laws that
preclude or significantly interfere with the parties' agreement to arbitrate. For FAA
preemption cases involving state laws that precluded the arbitrations agreed to by the
parties, see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). In Volt
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, the
relevant provision of California arbitration law stayed the arbitration pending
completion of a state court action to adjudicate issues of fact and law also pertaining to
the arbitration. See 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989). On the other hand, state international
arbitration statutes do not contain provisions that preclude or significantly hinder
arbitration.
81 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67,
61 S. Ct. 399, 404, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941)).
12TRIBE, supra note 79, at 481. A court may also strike down a state law when
the federal law validly occupies the entire field. See id. However, the Supreme Court
has held that the FAA "does not reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field
of arbitration." Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
13 TRIBE, supra note 79, at 481-83.
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statutes. The author chooses to examine provisions amenable to
preemption analysis contained in selected state international
arbitration statutes. The author divides these state international
arbitration act provisions into two general groups: (1) state law
provisions concerning matters addressed expressly in chapter 1 or
2 of the FAA; and (2) state law provisions concerning matters not
addressed expressly in the FAA or the New York Convention.8 4
With regard to state international arbitration act provisions
concerning matters addressed expressly in chapter 1 or 2 of the
FAA, this part compares the pertinent state law provision with the
corresponding FAA provision to determine whether the state law
provision conflicts directly with the FAA provision to the extent
the state law provision may provide a broader basis to refuse the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement or arbitral award than
provided in the FAA." This part's examination of state
"This part analyzes whether the FAA may preempt state international
arbitration act provisions that concern the following matters addressed expressly by
provisions in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA: (1) court intervention to enforce agreements to
arbitrate within a particular state, by means of stay orders or court orders to compel
arbitration; (2) confirmation and vacation of arbitral awards rendered inside the
particular state; and (3) recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This
part also analyzes whether the FAA or the New York Convention may preempt state
international arbitration act provisions that concern the following matters not addressed
expressly by the FAA or the Convention: (1) discovery orders issued by the arbitrators
or a court in aid of arbitration; (2) provisional measures ordered by a court in aid of
arbitration, focusing on court orders for pre-award attachment and preliminary
injunctions; and (3) the competence of an arbitral tribunal to rule on questions
concerning the scope or validity of an arbitration agreement. The author chooses to
examine primarily state law provisions contained in the international arbitration
legislation enacted in California, Florida, and Georgia, since these state statutes are
representative of the different state law approaches among the state international
arbitration statutes currently enacted. For further discussion concerning the California,
Florida, and Georgia statutes as representative of the different state law approaches, see
supra note 30.
85 The Washington Foreign Law Society Report suggests comparison of FAA
and state law provisions as a method for resolving preemption questions. "To the extent
a state statute is consistent with the 'procedural' provisions [all FAA provisions except
section 2] of the FAA, it would presumably not be preempted. If, however, the state
enacted statute varies substantially from the FAA, the court would have to determine
whether the state procedures infringe on the substantive command of section 2 of the
FAA [ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements]. If they do, a federal court
may find such procedures to be preempted by the federal statute." Washington Foreign
Law Society Report, supra note 27, at 324-25. Born also suggests a similar comparative
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international arbitration act provisions concerning matters not
addressed expressly by the FAA or the Convention focuses on
whether the application of such state law provisions may frustrate
or undermine a purpose or policy of the FAA or the Convention.
Overall, the analysis of preemption issues in this part reveals
that few provisions contained in the state international arbitration
statutes examined conflict directly with provisions in chapter 1 or
2 of the FAA, or frustrate the purposes and policies of the FAA or
the New York Convention. These results suggest that the extent of
preemption of provisions in state international arbitration statutes
is not significant." The infrequency that the state international
arbitration act provisions examined conflict with FAA provisions
or undermine the purposes or policies of the FAA or the
Convention argues against the need for amending the FAA in
order to preempt state international arbitration statutes.
analysis to determine whether provisions in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA may preempt state
arbitration law provisions. See generally BORN, supra note 6.
861n this part, the author chooses to analyze whether the FAA may preempt
particular provisions in state international arbitration statutes without examining the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt on questions of preemption of state
arbitration law. As noted previously, the Volt Court agreed with the lower courts that by
including a standard choice of law clause selecting state law the parties intended to
incorporate state arbitration law into their arbitration agreement. As a result, the FAA
could not preempt the state arbitration law provision that the FAA would otherwise
preempt if the parties had not included the standard choice of law clause selecting state
law. Part III examines questions concerning possible preemption of state arbitration law
provisions without addressing the implications of the Volt decision on preemption
questions since it appears that the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono limits the
impact of the Volt decision. Part IV reveals that the Court's holding in Mastrobuono
seems to preclude a finding that a standard choice of law clause indicates the parties'
intention to apply state arbitration law that the FAA would otherwise preempt, unless the
choice of law clause expressly provides for the application of such a state law provision.
For discussion of the Court's treatment in Volt and Mastrobuono of the impact on
questions of FAA preemption of the inclusion of both a standard choice of law clause
and an arbitration clause, see infra notes 251-75 and accompanying text. Another
commentator professes that questions of preemption and the parties' intent concerning
the effect of a standard choice of law clause on the law applicable to their arbitration
merit separate inquiries. See Arthur S. Feldman, Note, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University: Confusing Federalism with
Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEx. L. REv. 691, 711 (1991). Feldman comments
that "[t]he difficulties that confront a court attempting to discern what the parties
intended when a contract contains both an agreement to arbitrate and a concurrent choice
of law clause are potentially enormous. Some unnecessary confusion might be avoided
by distinguishing this inquiry" from "the discrete topic" of FAA preemption. Id.
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A. Enforcement ofArbitration Agreements by Court Order to
Stay Litigation or to Compel Arbitration
Concluding that section 2 of the FAA applies in state courts,
the Supreme Court has held consistently that the FAA preempts
state legislation requiring a judicial forum for claims the parties
agreed to arbitrate. 7 In Southland Corp. v. Keating," the Supreme
Court ruled that the provision of the California Franchise
Investment Law, interpreted by the California Supreme Court to
require the adjudication of claims brought under the statute,
conflicted directly with section 2 of the FAA and violated the
Supremacy Clause. 9 The Court in Southland declared that "in
enacting section 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. '"" The Court
also held in Perry v. Thomas91 and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson,92 decisions subsequent to Southland, that the FAA
preempts state laws that require the litigation of claims the parties
agreed to arbitrate.93
87See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). See infra
notes 88-97 and accompanying text for discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in
Southland, Perry and Terminix.
88465 U.S. 1 (1984).
89See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. Tribe cites Southland as an example of federal
preemption of state law when federal and state legislation are directly contradictory on
their face. See TRIBE, supra note 79, at 482. Tribe comments that "federal regulation
obviously supersedes state regulation where compliance with both is a literal
impossibility." Id. at 481.
9°Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
91482 U.S. 483 (1987).
92115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
93 In Perry, the Court held that the FAA preempted a provision of the California
Labor Code allowing wage collection actions without regard to the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate, for there was an "unmistakable conflict" between state law and
the federal policy favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements embodied in
section 2 of the FAA. Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 (1987). In Terninix, the Court ruled that
the FAA preempted the provision in Alabama state law that prohibited the enforceability
of predispute arbitration agreements. See Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 834. The Court
declared that "state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration
agreements." Id. at 838 (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16, 104 S. Ct. at 860-61).
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The broader holding of Southland is that the FAA preempts
state law provisions that limit the enforceability of arbitration
agreements covered by the FAA. In Southland, the Court declared
that "in creating a substantive rule [section 2 of the FAA]
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability
of arbitration agreements."94 As a result, state arbitration law may
not impose restrictions on the enforceability of arbitration
agreements beyond the restrictions on enforceability set out in
sections 1 and 2 of the FAA.95
Southland and its progeny establish that the FAA preempts
state arbitration law that conflicts with the federal policy embodied
in section 2 of the FAA favoring the enforceability of arbitration
agreements covered by the FAA.96  These Supreme Court
The respondents in Terminix argued that the Court should overrule Southland in order to
allow the Alabama court to apply its state's anti-arbitration provision even though this
provision makes written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable,
which clearly conflicts with section 2 of the FAA. However, the Supreme Court refused
to reconsider the well-established rule declared in Southland that the FAA preempts
state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements. See id. at 838-39.
94 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. One commentator states that the Terminix decision
also reaffirms the broader holding of Southland. "Terminix signals that the Supreme
Court will not tolerate efforts by the state legislatures or judiciaries to undermine the
clear purpose of the FAA - the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate."
Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea
Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1996).
95See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11. The Court declared that the FAA places two
limitations on the enforceability of arbitration agreements: (1) the underlying contract
that contains the arbitration agreement must satisfy the commerce requirement or
involve a maritime transaction pursuant to section 1; and (2) section 2 provides for the
revocation of arbitration clauses upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Id. In dicta, the Southland court professed that "we see
nothing in the [Federal Arbitration] Act indicating that the broad principle of
enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under State law." Id.
96 The 1988 Washington Foreign Law Society Report concludes that the FAA
"presumably" would not preempt state law where the state statutory provisions are
consistent with the "procedural" provisions (all FAA provisions except for section 2) of
the FAA. Washington Foreign Law Society Report, supra note 27, at 324-25. However,
if state procedural provisions "vary [sic] substantially" from the corresponding FAA
provisions such that the state law provisions conflict with the federal substantive policy
favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements expressed in section 2, then a court
"may find" that the FAA preempts such state law procedural provisions. Id. at 325.
Note that the Washington Foreign Law Society Report preceded the Supreme Court's
1989 decision in Volt.
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decisions as well as the Volt decision reveal that "the Court views
commercial arbitration under the FAA as a matter of contract, and
the role of the judiciary under the Act primarily to be a simple
matter of enforcing agreements to arbitrate."97 In accordance with
the FAA's emphasis on enforcing the parties' agreement to
arbitrate, commentators have articulated different conceptions of
the types of state laws that the FAA may preempt, including state
laws that interfere with the parties' intent to arbitrate,9" deprive a
party from availing itself of the contractual right to arbitration," or
limit the freedom of contract with regard to arbitration
agreements. 100
Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, which authorize court orders to
stay the litigation of arbitrable issues and to compel arbitration, are
central to furthering the federal substantive policy favoring the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. As a result, in order to
avoid preemption by section 3 or 4 of the FAA, a state law
provision authorizing such court intervention to enforce arbitration
agreements within the state would likely have to appear similar to
97 Hayford, supra note 94, at 17.
98See Feldman, supra note 86, at 711. Feldman comments "preemption is
relevant only to the extent that state law might interfere with the parties' ability to carry
forward their intent to arbitrate, the one element of an arbitration agreement the FAA
protects in all instances." Id.
99See Garvey & Heffelfinger, supra note 17, at 212. Garvey & Heffelfinger
profess that the FAA preempts a state statutory provision that does not conflict with a
specific FAA provision, when the state law provision is so burdensome as to effectively
"deprive [not just delay] the right of a party to avail itself of its contractual right to
arbitration." Id.
"°See Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of
Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM
L. REv. 529, 571 (1994). Ware comments that "a state law that limits freedom of
contract with regard to arbitration agreements conflicts with the FAA and is preempted
by it." Id. For example, New York case law refuses to enforce arbitration agreements
that give the arbitrators the power to award punitive damages. See Garrity v. Lyle
Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1976). Ware
professes that the FAA preempts Garrity which limits the freedom to contract for
punitive damages. See Ware, supra, at 571. This statement by Ware anticipates the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Mastrobuono where the Court declared that "in the
absence of contractual intent to the contrary, the FAA would preempt the Garrity rule."
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1995). Ware
also declares that the FAA would preempt a state law rule that limits the freedom to
contract against arbitral awards of punitive damages. See Ware, supra, at 571.
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section 3 or 4 of the FAA. l0'
Section 3 of the FAA provides that a "court of the United
States" shall stay proceedings involving "any issue referable to
arbitration" pursuant to a written arbitration agreement."2 The
provisions authorizing their respective state courts to stay
litigation of arbitrable issues contained in the California
international arbitration statute and the Georgia Code do not
conflict with the language of section 3 of the FAA.13 Thus, these
state statutory provisions do not appear to raise preemption
concerns.
The provision concerning court-ordered stays of litigation
contained in the Florida International Arbitration Act sets forth
three circumstances under which a Florida court may not stay an
action before it involving a dispute "subject to arbitration. '14
Since section 3 of the FAA does not expressly include the
exceptions to the issuance of stay orders provided in section
10 "A state court entertaining an arbitration dispute within the scope of section 2
of the FAA would probably have to provide state procedures for court intervention
similar to sections 3 and 4. Otherwise, its procedures would be preempted by these
federal provisions." Washington Foreign Law Society Report, supra note 27, at 325.
1029 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
103See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.81 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-6(a)
(LEXIS through 1996 Supp.). Section 1297.81 of the California international arbitration
statute provides in pertinent part that when a party to an international commercial
arbitration agreement pursuant to the California statute commences judicial proceedings
seeking relief with regard to a matter covered by the arbitration agreement, another party
to the arbitration agreement may apply to a California superior court for an order to stay
the judicial proceedings. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.81. Section 9-9-6(a) of the
Georgia Code provides in pertinent part that if an issue claimed to be arbitrable is
involved in a pending Georgia court action, an order to compel arbitration issued by the
Georgia court operates to stay a pending or subsequent court action. See GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-9-6(a), 9-9-30.
104FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.22(2) (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd Reg.
Sess.). Section 684.22(2) provides that a Florida court may issue such a stay if the court
could issue an order compelling arbitration under section 684.22(1). Section 684.22(1)
provides that a Florida court may issue an order compelling arbitration unless the court
finds one of the following: (1) there was fraud in the inducement of the written
arbitration agreement; (2) submission of the dispute to arbitration would be contrary to
the public policy of Florida or the United States; or (3) an arbitral tribunal constituted
pursuant to the written arbitration agreement determined previously that the dispute is
not arbitrable or that the arbitration agreement is invalid or unenforceable. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 684.22(1)(a)-(c).
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684.22(2) of the Florida International Arbitration Act, the FAA
may preempt these state law provisions if such state law
provisions create limitations on the enforceability of arbitration
agreements additional to the limitations imposed by the FAA. °5
Two of the exceptions to the issuance of stay orders under the
Florida International Arbitration Act do not appear to present
preemption concerns. Pursuant to sections 684.22(l)(a) and
684.22(2), a Florida court may not issue a stay order if the court
finds fraud in the inducement of the written arbitration
agreement. 0 6  Since section 2 of the FAA would make
unenforceable an arbitration agreement induced by fraud, this state
law provision does not place additional limitations on the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. In addition, sections
684.22(1)(c) and 684.22(2) preclude the issuance of a stay order if
the Florida court finds that an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant
to the written arbitration agreement determined previously that the
dispute is not arbitrable or that the arbitration agreement is invalid
or unenforceable. 7 These state law provisions do not seem to
present preemption concerns. Section 3 of the FAA allows stays
of litigation with regard to issues "referable to arbitration.
108
Moreover, a stay order pursuant to section 3 would not apply to an
arbitration agreement deemed invalid or unenforceable.1 9
However, sections 684.22(1)(b) and 684.22(2) of the Florida
1°"See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's
conclusion in Southland that state arbitration law may not impose restrictions on the
enforceability of arbitration agreements beyond the restrictions on enforceability
expressed in sections 1 and 2 of the FAA. Neither chapters 2 nor 3 of the FAA, which
implement the United States' obligations under the New York and Inter-American
Conventions respectively, include provisions equivalent to section 3 of chapter 1 of the
FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, 301-307. As a result, the FAA may preempt state law
provisions concerning stay orders only if the arbitration agreement falls within the scope
of chapter 1 of the FAA. However, while the basis for such decisions is not clear, U.S.
courts have stayed actions before them involving disputes arbitrable under the
conventions. See BoRN, supra note 6, at 447.
106See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.22(1)(a), 684.22(2).
'
07See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.22(l)(c), 684.22(2).
1089 U.S.C. § 3.
1°gSection 2 of the FAA provides in pertinent part that an arbitration agreement
is invalid or unenforceable "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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International Arbitration Act provide that a Floridacourt may not
stay litigation of arbitrable issues if the court finds arbitration of
the dispute contrary to the public policy of Florida or the United
States."10  Commentators have stated that this public policy
exception should only apply if submission of the dispute to
arbitration "would thwart some basic legislative regime""' or
would conflict with a "fundamental constitutional principle" ' 12 of
Florida or the United States. If a Florida court applied this public
policy exception expansively, then this provision could create
preemption concerns. A federal or state appellate court should
rule that section 3 of the FAA preempts sections 684.22(l)(b) and
684.22(2) of the Florida International Arbitration Act if a Florida
circuit court invoked these state law provisions as grounds for
refusing to stay litigation, such that the public policy exception
precluded the enforceability of an arbitration agreement that the
FAA would otherwise enforce."
3
Section 4 of the FAA provides that a United States district
court may issue an order compelling arbitration, as provided for in
the written arbitration agreement, within the district where the
parties file the petition requesting the compulsion order." 4 As a
"°See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.22(1)(b), 684.22(2) (West, WESTLAW through
1996 2nd Reg. Sess.).
"'Carlos E. Loumiet et al., Proposed Florida International Arbitration Act, 16
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 591, 641 (1985) [hereinafter Loumiet, Proposed Florida
Act].
"
2Loumiet, Introduction to Florida Act, supra note 32, at 954.
"
3 The author takes the position that section 3 of the FAA may only preempt
sections 684.22(1)(b) and 684.22(2) of the Florida International Arbitration Act if a
Florida circuit court read these state law provisions expansively with the result that the
state court ruling precluded the enforceability of an arbitration agreement that section 3
of the FAA would otherwise enforce. Absent such an actual ruling by a Florida circuit
court, a plaintiff would not appear to have standing to claim that the state statutory
provisions were in conflict with section 3 of the FAA, and thus violated the Supremacy
Clause. The hypothetical possibility that a Florida circuit court would read these state
statutory provisions expansively would not appear to result in a sufficient chilling effect
on the parties' choice of the Florida International Arbitration Act as the applicable law
or on the effective conduct of an arbitration pursuant to the Florida statute to satisfy the
requirement that the plaintiff suffer actual injury in order for a plaintiff to have standing
to bring a claim alleging violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.
114See 9 U.S.C. § 4.
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result of the Supreme Court's decision in Southland that section 2
of the FAA creates federal substantive law favoring the
enforceability of arbitration agreements applicable in state courts,
state arbitration law may not impose restrictions on the
enforceability of arbitration agreements beyond the restrictions on
enforceability provided in sections 1 and 2 of the FAA."5
Provisions concerning court orders to compel arbitration included
in the California international arbitration statute and the Georgia
Code do not appear to raise preemption concerns since these
provisions do not impose restrictions on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements additional to those mandated by the FAA."'6
On the other hand, under the Florida International Arbitration
Act, the three exceptions that apply to the issuance of court orders
to stay litigation also apply to the issuance of court orders to
compel arbitration pursuant to section 684.22(1) of the Florida
statute."7 Thus, as discussed previously with regard to the Florida
provision concerning court orders to stay litigation, a federal or
state appellate court should rule that section 4 of the FAA
15 For discussion concerning this aspect of the Southland decision, see supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
" 
6Section 1297.81 of the California international arbitration statute provides in
pertinent part that when a party to an international commercial arbitration agreement as
defined under the California statute initiates judicial proceedings involving a matter
covered by the arbitration agreement, any other party to the arbitration agreement may
apply to a California superior court for an order to compel arbitration. See CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 1297.81 (West 1996). The Georgia Code provides that upon application
of a party, a Georgia state court shall order the parties to arbitrate if the court determines
the following: (1) there is no "substantial issue" concerning the validity of the
arbitration agreement or compliance with the arbitration agreement; or (2) time
limitations do not bar the arbitration of the claims at issue. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-
6(a), 9-9-30 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.). Section 1297.81 of the California
international arbitration statute and section 9-9-6(a) of the Georgia Code do not provide
that court orders to compel arbitration must require that the arbitration occur within the
judicial district where the parties have filed the petition requesting the compulsion order
as provided in section 4 of the FAA. However, this difference between these state law
provisions and the FAA's section 4 does not appear to raise preemption concerns, since
these state law provisions, which do not restrict the place within their respective state
where the arbitration may occur, more readily enforce arbitration agreements than
section 4 of the FAA.
"
7TSee supra note 104 for discussion of the exceptions to the issuance of a court
order to compel arbitration pursuant to section 684.22(1) of the Florida International
Arbitration Act.
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preempts section 684.22(1) of the Florida statute if a Florida
circuit court applied this state law provision's public policy
exception broadly in order to deny a request to compel arbitration
with the result that the application of state law prevented the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement that the FAA would
otherwise enforce.
18
B. Vacation of International Arbitral Awards Rendered Inside
the Particular State
Provisions included in a state's international arbitration statute
or in the state's general arbitration law address the confirmation or
vacation of international arbitral awards rendered in the particular
state." 9 The paragraphs that follow will discuss the extent that
relevant provisions contained in chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA may
preempt state law provisions that apply to the vacation of
international arbitral awards rendered in the particular state.' The
"
8 The FAA's section 4 may preempt a state statutory provision concerning
court orders to compel arbitration if the arbitration agreement falls within the scope of
chapter 1 of the FAA. For discussion of the scope of chapter 1 of the FAA, see supra
notes 43-54 and accompanying text. However, if the arbitration agreement falls within
the scope of chapter 2 of the FAA, then section 206 of the FAA's chapter 2 may preempt
state law provisions authorizing state courts to compel arbitration. "It appears settled
that federal court jurisdiction to enforce section 206 is not exclusive, but merely
concurrent with the jurisdiction of state courts." BORN, supra note 62, at 432. Section
206 provides in pertinent part that a court with jurisdiction under chapter 2 may compel
arbitration in accordance with the agreement of the parties. See 9 U.S.C. § 206. The
author's analysis concerning whether section 4 of the FAA may preempt the state law
provisions examined would seem to apply to whether section 206 may also preempt
these same state law provisions. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. Note
that section 206 may preempt corresponding state law provisions in cases involving
arbitration agreements that may result in a nondomestic award subject to the New York
Convention. While section 206 may also enforce agreements to arbitrate abroad, state
international arbitration statutes do not contain provisions that enforce such arbitration
agreements.
119Some state international arbitration statutes contain provisions concerning the
confirmation or vacation of international arbitral awards rendered in the particular state.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.24, 684.25 (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd
Reg. Sess.). Other state international arbitration legislation does not contain such
provisions, and thus the provisions concerning the confirmation and vacation of arbitral
awards contained in the state's general arbitration legislation apply. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 1285-1288; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-12, 9-9-13, 9-9-30.
120Since several state international arbitration statutes contain provisions that
expressly address the enforcement of international arbitral awards rendered abroad, the
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
analysis focuses on state law provisions concerning the vacation of
international arbitral awards rendered in the particular state,
because such state law provisions appear to present more
preemption issues than do state law provisions concerning the
confirmation of arbitral awards.'
2
'
State law provisions may provide the authority for a state court
to order the vacation of an international arbitral award rendered in
the respective state to the extent section 207 of the FAA's chapter
2 or section 10 of the FAA's chapter 1 do not preempt such state
law provisions. Specifically, section 207 or section 10 will
preempt state law provisions "providing for broader bases to
vacate awards than available under federal law.' ' 22  However,
section 207 or section 10 will not preempt state law provisions that
are less restrictive and more readily allow the confirmation of
international arbitral awards than provided under section 207 or
section 10.23 Thus, to avoid FAA preemption in a particular case,
a state law provision specifying the grounds for vacating
international arbitral awards need not contain language identical to
the grounds for vacating awards provided in section 207 or section
10.
As discussed previously, an international arbitral award
rendered in the United States may constitute a "nondomestic"
author will discuss the possible preemption of such provisions by the New York
Convention separately from questions of preemption involving state law provisions
authorizing state court orders to confirm or vacate international arbitral awards made in
the particular state. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text for this discussion
of state law provisions expressly applicable to the enforcement of international arbitral
awards rendered abroad.
'
2 The differences between federal and state law provisions addressing the
confirmation of awards are less amendable to preemption analysis than are federal and
state law provisions authorizing different grounds for vacating arbitral awards. For
example, section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 provides that any party to the arbitration
may apply to a court with jurisdiction under chapter 2 for an order confirming an award
within three years after an award falling under the Convention is made. See 9 U.S.C. §
207. State law provisions may provide for a different time period within which the party
to the arbitration must apply to the respective state court for an order confirming the
award. For example, section 9-9-12 of the Georgia Code provides that a party must
apply within one year after the award is rendered. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-12.
122BO N, supra note 6, at 679.
123See id. at 678-79.
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award subject to the New York Convention.2 4 Section 207 of the
FAA's chapter 2, which implements the United States' obligations
under the New York Convention, provides in pertinent part that a
court with jurisdiction under chapter 2 shall confirm an arbitral
award falling under the Convention unless the court invokes one
of the grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement of an
award stated in Article V of the New York Convention.2 5  If a
party invokes section 207 when requesting a state court to confirm
a nondomestic award, then the state court could vacate the award
by citing one of the specified grounds in Article V of the New
York Convention as provided in section 207.126 However, it is
"reasonably clear" that section 207 is not the exclusive avenue in
the United States for confirming or vacating an award subject to
the New York Convention.' Based on this conclusion, it appears
that a state law provision could authorize a state court to confirm
or vacate an arbitral award subject to the New York Convention to
the extent that section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 does not
preempt the state law provision.'28
Specifically, section 207 of chapter 2 of the FAA will preempt
124See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
'
25See 9 U.S.C. § 207. One can apply to either a federal or a state court to
confirm an arbitral award pursuant to section 207. See BORN, supra note 6, at 661.
'
26 See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1)(a)-(e), (2)(a)-(b).
127BORN, supra note 6, at 659. The Second Circuit has held that a party may
bring an action to confirm an award subject to the New York Convention by invoking
either section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2 or section 9 of the FAA's chapter 1. See
Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993).
Born comments that "presumably, state and common law actions to confirm an arbitral
award [subject to the New York Convention] are also possible under this theory." See
BORN, supra note 6, at 660.
128See id. at 678-79. As discussed previously, to avoid preemption by section
207, state law provisions specifying the grounds for vacating international arbitral
awards need not include language identical to the grounds provided in the New York
Convention's Article V, which may apply to vacate an international arbitral award
pursuant to section 207. See text supra p. 746. Note that sections 9 and 10 of the
FAA's chapter 1 could authorize a federal court to confirm or vacate an arbitral award
subject to the New York Convention to the extent that sections 9 and 10 do not conflict
with section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 which provides that
chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under chapter 2 to the extent that
chapter 1 does not conflict with chapter 2 or the New York Convention as ratified by the
United States.
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state law provisions if such state law provisions provide broader
bases to vacate awards than specified in Article V of the
Convention.'29 Provisions concerning the vacation of arbitral
awards in the California and Georgia state statutes appear
consistent with the grounds specified in Article V of the New York
Convention for vacating an arbitral award pursuant to section
207.130
Most grounds for vacating an arbitral award included in the
Florida International Arbitration Act are also consistent with the
corresponding provisions in Article V of the New York
Convention.13' However, several grounds for vacating an arbitral
129 As mentioned previously, section 207 provides that the court may vacate an
award if the court finds one of the grounds to refuse the recognition or enforcement of
an award set forth in Article V of the New York Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 207.
130Since the California international arbitration statute does not provide an
express provision addressing the vacation of arbitral awards, section 1286.2 of
California's general arbitration provisions applies. Similarly, section 9-9-13 of part 1 of
the Georgia Arbitration Code, which applies to arbitrations generally, specifies the
grounds upon which a Georgia court may vacate an arbitral award and applies to
international arbitrations subject to part 2 of the Georgia Arbitration Code. The
provisions in Article V of the New York Convention seem to present different grounds
for vacating an award than these provisions in the California and Georgia state laws.
See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(I)(a)-(e), (2)(a)-(b); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 1286.2 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.).
However, the grounds for vacating arbitral awards included in the California and
Georgia statutes do not appear to provide broader bases to vacate awards than specified
in Article V of the New York Convention pursuant to section 207. Note that these
California and Georgia statutory provisions contain language similar or identical to the
grounds for vacating an award pursuant to section 10 of chapter 1 of the FAA. See 9
U.S.C. § 10; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13.
'31The grounds for vacating an award provided in sections 684.25(1)(a), (l)(b),
(1)(f) and (l)(g) of the Florida International Arbitration Act are similar to the New York
Convention's Article V(1)(a), (l)(b), (l)(c), (1)(d), respectively. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 684.25(1)(a), (1)(b), (l)(f) and (1)(g) (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd Reg.
Sess.); New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(l)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (l)(d). Note that
section 684.25 of the Florida statute provides grounds for vacating an award or declaring
it not entitled to confirmation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25. Section 684.24(1)(b)
states that a court shall grant an application to vacate an award if the following occurs:
(1) one of the grounds for vacating an award pursuant to section 684.25 apply and (2)
either the arbitration occurred in Florida or the arbitration was subject to part II of the
Florida International Arbitration Act which concerns the conduct of the arbitration. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.24(l)(b). Section 684.24(1)(c) provides that a Florida court
shall declare an award not entitled to confirmation even though one of the grounds for
vacating an award pursuant to section 684.25 apply if both the arbitration did not occur
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award in section 684.25 of the Florida statute could create broader
bases to vacate an award than provided in Article V of the New
York Convention pursuant to section 207, if the Florida courts
interpreted these state law provisions expansively. Section
684.25(1)(c) provides that a Florida court may vacate an award if
"the arbitral tribunal conducted proceedings so unfairly as to
substantially prejudice the rights of the party challenging the
award."'' Broad interpretation of this provision by a Florida court
could conceivably result in the vacation of an award which section
207 would otherwise confirm.'33 A federal or state appellate court
should rule that section 207 preempts section 684.25(1)(c) of the
Florida International Arbitration Act if a Florida circuit court
invoked this state law provision to vacate an award that section
207 would enforce.3 4  Another provision that could raise
preemption concerns is section 684.25(1)(d), which provides in
pertinent part that a Florida court shall vacate an arbitral award
deemed contrary to Florida public policy.35 While the drafters
in Florida and the arbitration was not subject to part II of the Florida statute. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 684.24(l)(c).
132FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(1)(c).
133Section 684.25(1)(c) of the Florida statute allows Florida courts to deny
confirmation if "the tribunal's choice of procedure both offended some basic principle of
fairness and was critical to the outcome." Loumiet, Proposed Florida Act, supra note
111, at 650. While recognizing the broad wording of the provision, members of the task
force that drafted the Florida International Arbitration Act comment that this provision
"does not confer upon the courts a license to supervise or 'second guess' the tribunal."
Id.
134Absent an actual ruling by a Florida circuit court invoking section
684.25(1)(c) of the Florida International Arbitration Act, a plaintiff would not appear to
have standing to bring a suit claiming that section 684.25(l)(c) was in conflict with
section 207, and thus violated the Supremacy Clause. The hypothetical possibility that a
state court may apply section 684.25(l)(c) broadly to vacate an award that section 207
would enforce would not appear to give a prospective plaintiff standing. For further
discussion concerning the author's view that the FAA may only preempt a state
arbitration law provision if a state court has invoked the state law provision in an actual
case, see supra note 113.
135See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(1)(d). Note that both section 684.25(l)(d) of
the Florida International Arbitration Act and Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention authorize the vacation of an award deemed contrary to the public policy of
the United States. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(b); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 684.25(1)(d). However, Article V does not permit the vacation of arbitral award
viewed as contrary to public policy of a constituent state within a federation. See New
York Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
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intended this provision to apply "to assure that the award is not
offensive to some basic moral or legal principle"'36 of Florida, the
vacation of an award that section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2
would otherwise confirm could result if a Florida court interpreted
the Florida public policy exception broadly. In addition, section
684.25(1)(e) provides in pertinent part that a Florida court shall
vacate an award if a "neutral arbitrator had a material conflict of
interest with the party challenging the award.' 37 If a Florida court
gave a broad interpretation to "material conflict of interest,"
leading the court to vacate an award based on an apparent conflict
not affecting the vote of the neutral arbitrator, then a federal or
state appellate court should rule that section 207 preempts this
state law provision if the Florida circuit court's decision resulted
in the vacation of an award that section 207 would otherwise
confirm.'38
If an international arbitral award rendered in the United States
is not subject to the New York Convention and the underlying
arbitration agreement falls within the scope of chapter 1 of the
FAA, then state law provisions concerning state court orders to
vacate such awards may apply to the extent that the FAA's section
10 does not preempt such state law provisions. Specifically,
section 10 will preempt state law provisions that provide broader
bases to vacate an arbitral award than provided in section 10.'
136Loumiet, Proposed Florida Act, supra note 111, at 650.
13 7FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(l)(e).
138The task force that drafted the Florida International Arbitration Act did not
intend such a broad interpretation of section 684.25(1)(e). In order to invoke section
684.25(1)(e), members of the task force comment that "it must be shown that the vote of
the neutral arbitrator with the alleged conflict was critical to the award, or part thereof,
being challenged." Loumiet, Proposed Florida Act, supra note 111, at 651.
139See BORN, supra note 6, at 679. As discussed previously, to avoid
preemption by section 10 of the FAA, a state law provision specifying grounds for
vacating an international arbitral award need not contain language identical to the
grounds provided in section 10. See text supra p. 746. The language of section 10
suggests that section 10 does not apply directly in state court. Section 10 provides in
pertinent part that "the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made may make an order vacating the award." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). However, since
state courts must comply with the federal substantive policy favoring the enforceability
of arbitration agreements embodied in section 2 of the FAA, this suggests that state law
provisions must authorize grounds for vacating arbitral awards consistent with section
10 to avoid preemption. Born comments that "[i]f § 2's provisions regarding the
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The California and Georgia statutory provisions do not appear
to authorize broader grounds to vacate an award than provided in
section 10, since these state statutory provisions contain language
identical or similar to the grounds for vacation of awards specified
in section 10.1" While the Florida statutory provision was not
drafted to mirror the language of section 10 of the FAA, one can
interpret most grounds for vacating arbitral awards under the
Florida International Arbitration Act as consistent with section
10.141 On the other hand, section 684.25(l)(d) of the Florida
substantive enforceability of arbitration agreements must be followed by state courts,
then it is difficult to see why the provisions of §§ 9 and 10 concerning the enforceability
of arbitral awards would not be binding in a similar fashion." BORN, supra note 6, at
671 (citations omitted). However, one commentator contends that sections 9 and 10 do
not preempt state laws authorizing the vacation of arbitral awards on broader grounds
than provided for in the FAA. See Atwood, supra note 1, at 90-91.
14°See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-13,
9-9-30 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.); 9 U.S.C. § 10. Note that the California and
Georgia statutory provisions that apply to the vacation of international arbitral awards
rendered in the respective state are part of general arbitration provisions of these states.
See supra note 130. The consistency between these state statutory provisions and
section 10 of the FAA suggests a conscious attempt to draft state law provisions to avoid
conflict with section 10.
141Section 684.25(l)(d) of the Florida statute provides in part that a Florida
court may vacate an award "obtained by fraud, corruption, or undue influence" which is
language similar to section 10(a). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(1)(d); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
Section 684.25(1)(e) authorizes a Florida court to vacate an award if a neutral arbitrator
had a "material conflict of interest" with the party challenging the award. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 684.25(1)(d). One could plausibly view this provision as consistent with the
FAA's section 10(b), which permits vacation of an award if an arbitrator reveals
"evident partiality." 9 U.S.C. § 10(b). Section 684.25(1)(b) of the Florida statute allows
a Florida court to vacate an award if the party opposing the award was not given notice
of the appointment of the arbitral tribunal or of the arbitral proceedings. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 684.25(l)(b). Section 684.25(1)(c) provides that a Florida court shall vacate an
award if the arbitral tribunal conducted the proceedings "so unfairly as to substantially
prejudice the rights of the party challenging the award." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 684.25(l)(c). One could read sections 684.25(1)(b) and (1)(c) as consistent with the
FAA's section 10(c), which states in part that a court may vacate an award where the
arbitrators' misbehavior "prejudiced" the rights of any party to the arbitration. 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(c). Section 684.25(1)(g) of the Florida statute provides that a Florida court may
vacate an award if "the arbitral tribunal was not constituted in accordance with the
agreement of the parties." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(1)(g). This state law provision
appears consistent with the FAA's section 10(d), which allows the court to vacate an
award "where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.., that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(d).
Sections 684.25(1)(a) and (1)(f) provide that a Florida court may vacate an
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International Arbitration Act provides that a Florida court shall
vacate an arbitral award deemed contrary to the public policy of
the United States or Florida. 142 If a Florida court interpreted this
public policy exception expansively resulting in the vacation of an
award that sections 9 and 10 of the FAA would otherwise confirm,
then a federal or state appellate court should find that section 10 of
the FAA preempts section 684.25(1)(d) of the Florida statute.143
C. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Several state international arbitration statutes also contain
provisions that expressly address the recognition and enforcement
of international arbitral awards rendered abroad.'" As discussed
previously, it appears that these state law provisions could
authorize the respective state court to enforce or refuse
arbitral award if the arbitration agreement is invalid or the dispute is nonarbitrable. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(l)(a), (1)(f). One can view these provisions as consistent
with the federal substantive policy favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements
embodied in section 2 of the FAA.
142See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25(l)(d). Section 10 of the FAA's chapter 1 does
not specify United States or state public policy as a ground for vacating an award. See 9
U.S.C. § 10. Note that Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention authorizes United
States public policy as a ground for vacating an arbitral award pursuant to section 207 of
the FAA's chapter 2. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(b); 9 U.S.C. §
207.
'
43Absent an actual ruling by a Florida circuit court invoking section
684.25(1)(d) of the Florida International Arbitration Act, a plaintiff would not appear to
have standing to bring a suit claiming that section 684.25(1)(d) was in conflict with
section 10, and thus violated the Supremacy Clause. For further discussion concerning
the author's view that the FAA may only preempt a state arbitration law provision if a
state court has invoked the state law provision in an actual case, see supra note 113.
144The statutes enacted in Florida, Georgia, Connecticut and Oregon contain
provisions that expressly allow their state courts to enforce arbitral awards regardless of
the country where the award was made, as well as specify grounds for refusing to
enforce such awards. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-135, 50a-136 (West 1994);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.24, 684.25; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-42; OR. REv. STAT. §§
36.522, 36.524 (1995). Section 3-2B-03(a) of the Maryland statute provides in pertinent
part that "the arbitration statutes and laws of the United States" are Maryland state law
applicable to the enforcement of international arbitral awards. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-2B-03(a) (1995). Thus, Maryland state courts may only enforce arbitral
awards rendered abroad to the extent authorized by the New York and Inter-American
Conventions as well as federal law. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-
03(a), 3-2B-04(3). State statutes enacted in California, Hawaii, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Texas do not contain provisions expressly addressing state court enforcement of
arbitral awards rendered abroad.
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enforcement of a foreign arbitral award subject to the New York
Convention to the extent that section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2
does not preempt the state law provision.'45 Specifically, section
207 will preempt state law provisions authorizing their respective
state courts to refuse the recognition or enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards if such state law provisions provide broader bases
to refuse recognition or enforcement of awards than specified in
Article V of the Convention.'" However, to avoid preemption by
section 207, state law provisions need not include language
identical to the grounds provided in Article V of the New York
Convention, since section 207 will not preempt state law
provisions that allow their respective state courts to more readily
enforce foreign arbitral awards than would occur pursuant to
section 207.47
Most grounds for refusing the recognition or enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award specified in state international arbitration
statutes appear consistent with grounds provided in Article V of
New York Convention.' However, particular state law provisions
145See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
'"See BORN, supra note 6, at 679. As discussed previously, the FAA's section
207, which allows for vacation of awards pursuant to the grounds specified in Article V
of the New York Convention, as well as the FAA's section 10 will preempt state law
provisions authorizing a state court to order the vacation of an international arbitral
award rendered in the particular state when such state law provisions set forth broader
bases to vacate awards than provided in section 207 or section 10. See supra note 122
and accompanying text.
147See BORN, supra note 6, at 678.
14'Most grounds for refusing the recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award included in section 684.25 of the Florida International Arbitration Act are
consistent with the corresponding provisions in Article V of the New York Convention.
The grounds for refusing the recognition and enforcement of a foreign award provided
in sections 684.25(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(f), and (1)(g) of the Florida statute are similar to the
New York Convention's Article V(l)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(d), respectively. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.25(l)(a), (1)(b), (1)(f), (l)(g); New York Convention, supra
note 5, art. V(l)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d). Note that section 684.25 of the Florida
International Arbitration Act provides the same grounds for both refusing the
enforcement of foreign awards and vacating international arbitral awards rendered in
Florida. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25. Section 9-9-42 of the Georgia Code provides
that a Georgia court may refuse to recognize or enforce an arbitral award rendered
abroad if one of the grounds for vacating an award rendered inside the state pursuant to
section 9-9-13 applies. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-13, 9-9-42. The grounds specified in
section 9-9-13 of the Georgia Code do not appear to provide broader bases to refuse
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authorizing a state court to refuse the recognition or enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards may create a broader basis to refuse the
recognition or enforcement of an award than provided in Article V
of the New York Convention, if a state court interpreted such state
law provisions expansively. For example, state statutes authorize
their respective state courts to refuse the recognition or
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards if such recognition or
enforcement would be contrary to state public policy.149 Moreover,
some state statutes allow a state court to refuse the recognition or
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if the subject matter of the
dispute is not arbitrable under state law. 5 ' A federal or state
appellate court should rule that section 207 of the FAA's chapter 2
preempts such state law provisions if a state court decision
interpreted the state law provision expansively with the result that
the state court denied recognition or enforcement to a foreign
arbitral award that Article V of the New York Convention would
recognize or enforce.' In addition, an expansive interpretation of
several of the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of a
foreign award specified in the Florida International Arbitration Act
could provide broader bases for denying recognition or
enforcement than provided in Article V of the New York
Convention.12 A federal or state appellate court should rule that
recognition or enforcement of an award than provided in Article V of the New York
Convention. See supra note 130. Most of the grounds for refusing the recognition or
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards provided in the Connecticut and Oregon
international arbitration statutes contain language identical to the provisions of Article V
of the New York Convention. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-136(l)(a)(i-v); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 36.524(1)(a)(A-E); New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(a-e).
149See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-136(1)(b)(ii); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
684.25(1)(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-42; OR. REV. STAT. § 36.524(l)(b)(B).
°
50 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-136(1)(b)(i); OR. REv. STAT. § 36-
524(l)(b)(A).
"'While Article V of the New York Convention does authorize refusal of the
recognition or enforcement of an award viewed as contrary to United States public
policy or concerned with subject matter not capable of settlement by arbitration under
United States law, Article V does not expressly permit the refusal of the recognition or
enforcement of an award deemed contrary to the public policy or arbitrability rules of a
constituent state. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(a), (b).
152For further discussion of the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement
of a foreign arbitral award provided in the Florida statute that a Florida circuit court
could invoke to refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign award entitled to
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section 207 preempts such Florida statutory provisions if a Florida
circuit court invoked such a state law provision to deny
recognition or enforcement to a foreign award entitled to
recognition or enforcement under Article V of the New York
Convention.
If a foreign or nondomestic arbitral award is subject to the
New York Convention, then a party may invoke section 205 of
chapter 2 of the FAA in order to remove to federal court an action
to refuse enforcement or to vacate an award brought in state court
pursuant to a state international arbitration statute.' After
removal to federal court, section 207 would apply to enforce or
confirm an award subject to chapter 2 of the FAA. 54  Thus,
removal to federal court would preclude the applicability of state
law provisions that provide broader bases to refuse enforcement or
vacate arbitral awards subject to chapter 2 of the FAA than
provided in Article V of the Convention.
D. Discovery Orders in Aid ofArbitration
The parties may agree on the discovery and evidentiary
procedures for their international arbitration either in their
arbitration agreement or after the arbitration commences."5 If the
parties have not reached such an agreement, the applicable law
will have significant influence on the availability of discovery and
evidentiary procedures in an international arbitration.'56
recognition or enforcement under the New York Convention, see supra notes 131-37.
Note that section 684.25 of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides the same
grounds for both refusing the recognition or enforcement of foreign awards and vacating
international arbitral awards rendered in Florida. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.25.
153See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1994). Section 205 provides in pertinent part that if an
action pending in a state court relates to an award subject to the New York Convention,
then a defendant to the state court action may remove the action to the United States
district court within the district and division where the state court action is pending prior
to the trial of the state court action. See id.
154See BORN, supra note 6, at 678,
'"5See id. at 82-83.
156See id. at 82. Absent agreement by the parties, applicable arbitral rules as
well as the nationalities and legal backgrounds of the arbitrators may also influence the
availability of discovery in international arbitration. See id. However, arbitral rules do
not define significantly the authority of the arbitral tribunal or the courts within the three
central subject areas that concern discovery in international arbitration. See infra note
157 and accompanying text. The legal backgrounds of the arbitrators can also influence
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The influence of the applicable law on the availability of
discovery and evidentiary procedures in international arbitration
may depend on substantive legal provisions that address the
following matters: (1) the authority of the arbitrators to order pre-
hearing discovery and to request the production of evidence at the
arbitral proceeding; (2) the authority of courts to enforce discovery
orders issued by the arbitral tribunal; and (3) the authority of
courts to order discovery in aid of arbitration at the request of a
party.157 Section 7 of the FAA expressly addresses the authority of
the tribunal to order the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence at the arbitral proceeding, as well as court
enforcement of such orders issued by the tribunal. 5 ' In addition to
addressing these matters, provisions in state international
arbitration statutes also authorize the arbitrators to order pre-
hearing discovery, a subject not addressed by section 7 of the
FAA.'59 Moreover, while section 7 of the FAA does not expressly
permit courts to order discovery in aid of arbitration, state
international arbitration statutes also authorize courts to order
discovery in aid of arbitration at the request of the tribunal or a
party to the arbitration. 6 These differences between section 7 of
the FAA and such state statutory provisions raise questions
concerning whether section 7 may preempt provisions contained in
state international arbitration statutes addressing discovery matters
on which section 7 is silent.
As revealed below, state law provisions allowing court-ordered
the extent and nature of discovery orders issued by the arbitral tribunal. Stemming from
the inquisitional approach to evidence gathering central to civil law systems, arbitrators
from civil law countries will generally not favor tribunal orders for discovery initiated
by a party. See Arthur L. Marriott, Evidence in International Arbitration, 5 ARB. INT'L
280, 283-84 (1989). On the other hand, arbitrators from common law nations will more
likely issue orders allowing discovery directed by the parties. See BORN, supra note 6, at
83.
157See id. at 826-61.
158 See 9 U.S.C. § 7.
159For discussion concerning state international arbitration act provisions that
authorize arbitrators to order pre-hearing discovery, see infra notes 164-67 and
accompanying text.
'
61For discussion concerning state international arbitration act provisions that
authorize their respective state courts to order discovery in aid of arbitration at the
request of the tribunal or a party to the arbitration, see infra note 181 and accompanying
text.
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discovery in aid of arbitration at the request of a party appear to
raise the most significant preemption concerns. While the cases
do not involve state law provisions, federal courts have denied
parties' requests for court-ordered discovery in aid of arbitration
citing the FAA's underlying policy that courts should avoid
interfering with the arbitral process. 6' The state law provisions
examined permitting a party to request court-ordered discovery in
aid of arbitration further the arbitral process. Thus, the "judicial
interference" caused by such provisions in state international
arbitration statutes does not justify preemption of these state law
provisions by section 7 of the FAA.
Section 7 of the FAA provides in part that the arbitrator "may
summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of
them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them
any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed
material as evidence in the case."'62 While this provision allows
arbitrators to request the attendance of witnesses and the
production of material evidence at the arbitral proceedings, section
7 does not expressly authorize the arbitrators to require pre-
hearing depositions or the discovery of documents.163
161In general, federal courts denying party requests for court-ordered discovery
in aid of arbitration have not articulated clearly why such court-ordered discovery
constitutes undesirable judicial interference in the arbitral process. However, one
federal district court cited the likelihood that court administration. of the discovery
process "could preshape the issues before the arbitrator." Recognition Equip., Inc. v.
NCR Corp., 532 F. Supp. 271, 275 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Other federal courts have not
declared explicitly why court-ordered discovery constitutes undesirable judicial
interference in the arbitral process. For further discussion, see infra note 179.
1629 U.S.C. § 7.
163Federal courts have reached different conclusions concerning whether
arbitrators can order pre-hearing discovery pursuant to section 7 of the FAA. Some
lower federal courts have held that FAA section 7 does not allow an arbitral tribunal to
order pre-hearing discovery, but only to require the production of material evidence at
the arbitral hearing. "Arbitration has never afforded to litigants complete freedom to
delve into and explore at will, the adversary party's files under the pretense of pre-trial
discovery." Local Lodge 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Pratt & Whitney, 329 F. Supp. 283, 286-287 (D. Conn. 1971) (enforcing arbitrator's
subpoena, but requiring in camera inspection of disputed evidence by the arbitrator and
allowing parties access only to "relevant evidence in the dispute"). See also Wilkes-
Barre Publ'g Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, 559 F. Supp. 875 (M.D. Pa.
1982); Oceanic Trans. Corp. of Monorovia v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 129 F. Supp. 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1954). Other federal courts have enforced broad discovery orders issued by
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On the other hand, provisions in state international arbitration
statutes expressly authorize the arbitrators to order pre-hearing
discovery.' 64  Section 684.15(2) of the Florida International
Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part that the arbitral tribunal
"may order depositions to be taken or other discovery obtained,
without regard to the place where the witness or other evidence is
located.W65  The Georgia Code provision applicable to
international arbitrations conducted within the state allows the
arbitrators to establish procedures for the use of depositions and
"other discovery" during an arbitration.'6 The California
international arbitration statute, citing sections applicable
generally to arbitrations conducted within the state, provides that
the arbitrators may issue a subpoena requiring the attendance of
witnesses or a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of
documents at a "deposition for discovery.'
67
arbitrators revealing the reluctance of these courts to question the determination
regarding the materiality of the evidence made by the arbitrators. "Under the [Federal]
Arbitration Act, the arbitrators may order and conduct such discovery as they find
necessary." Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241, 1242
(S.D. Fla. 1988); see also Corcoran v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113
(N.D. Ga. 1984); Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558 (S.D.
Miss. 1976).
16In accordance with section 7 of the FAA, state statutory provisions applicable
to international arbitrations conducted within the respective state also authorize the
arbitral tribunal to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the production of
documents at the arbitral proceeding. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1282.6(a),
1297.271 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.15(2) (West, WESTLAW through 1996
2nd Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-9(a), 9-9-30 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.).
However, section 684.15(2) of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides that the
arbitral tribunal may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the production
of evidence at the arbitral hearing "without regard to the place where the witness or
other evidence is located." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.15(2). The absence of territorial
limitations on the service of such subpoenas differs from section 7 of the FAA, which
states that the arbitrators shall issue a summons that "shall be served in the same manner
as subpoenas to appear and testify before the [United States district] court." 9 U.S.C. §
7. Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows service of subpoenas only
within the judicial district in which the United States district court is located. See BORN,
supra note 6, at 846-47.
165 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.15(2).
'
6 6GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-9(b), 9-9-30.
167CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1282.6(a), 1283.05(a)(e), 1297.271. It would
appear that arbitrators presiding over an international arbitration subject to the California
international arbitration statute could issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of
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If an arbitration agreement is subject to chapter 1 or 2 of the
FAA, then state law provisions authorizing the arbitrator to order
pre-hearing discovery would appear applicable unless a court
deemed such provisions contrary to a policy underlying the
FAA.'68 While not addressing whether section 7 of the FAA may
preempt state law provisions authorizing arbitrators to order pre-
hearing discovery, federal courts have suggested that parties to an
arbitration should not have access to pre-hearing discovery, for by
agreeing to arbitrate their dispute, parties agreed impliedly to
forego the benefits and costs of judicial discovery. 169  It is
conceivable that a court could articulate the FAA's purpose of
providing disputants with a less costly and time consuming
alternative to litigation to justify preemption of state law
provisions authorizing pre-hearing discovery ordered by the
arbitrators.7
However, the Uniform Arbitration Act appears to allow the
arbitrators to sanction pre-hearing depositions.17 Thus, since the
witnesses or the production of documents at "deposition for discovery" or a deposition
"taken for use as evidence and not for discovery." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1282.6(a),
1283, 1283.05(a)(e), 1297.271.
168Bom comments that there is no lower court precedent addressing whether
state law can validly authorize an arbitrator to order discovery if the arbitration
agreement is subject to the FAA or the New York Convention. See BORN, supra note 6,
at 847. During the arbitration, questions concerning the scope of the arbitrators'
authority to order discovery can arise in the following circumstances: (1) the party to
the arbitration resists the discovery orders issued by the arbitral tribunal; or (2) the party
opposing a judicial action to enforce a discovery order issued by the arbitral tribunal
questions the tribunal's authority to order such discovery. See id. at 833.
169 "By voluntarily becoming a party to a contract in which arbitration was the
agreed mode for settling disputes thereunder respondent chose to avail itself of
procedures peculiar to the arbitral process rather than those used in judicial
determinations." In re the Arbitration between Commercial Solvents Corp. and La.
Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (denying a party's request to
take depositions of the employees of the other party to an arbitration pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Recognition Equip., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 532
F. Supp. 271, 275 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
17°While a court could articulate this position, the primary purpose of Congress
in enacting the FAA was to ensure the enforceability of arbitration agreements rather to
establish expedited procedures for settling disputes. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
171 Section 7(b) of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides that a party may apply
to the court to use a deposition as evidence, and the arbitrators "may permit a deposition
to be taken, in the manner and upon terms designated by the arbitrators, of a witness
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Uniform Arbitration Act, designed to complement the FAA,
authorizes arbitrators to order pre-hearing depositions, this
suggests that section 7 of the FAA should not preempt similar
provisions contained in state international arbitration statutes.172
Section 7 of the FAA provides in part that if a party does not
comply with a subpoena requiring the attendance of witnesses or
the production of documents issued by the arbitrators, then the
arbitrators may petition the United States district court in the
district where the arbitrators "are sitting" for an order compelling
compliance.' On the other hand, the provisions concerning the
enforcement of subpoenas and other discovery orders applicable to
international arbitrations subject to the Florida, Georgia, and
California statutes authorize either the arbitrators or a party to the
arbitration to request such judicial enforcement.' While one
who cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing." UNIF. ARBrRATION ACT
§ 7(b), 7 U.L.A. 114 (1985).
1'7 Note that section 7 of the Uniform Arbitration Act does not authorize the
arbitrators to order types of pre-hearing discovery other than depositions. Section
684.15(2) of the Florida International Arbitration Act and section 9-9-9(b) of the
Georgia Code permit the arbitrators to allow other types of pre-hearing discovery. See
supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
1739 U.S.C. § 7 (1994). Note that the express language of section 7 does not
indicate whether the arbitrators or the parties to the arbitration may petition the United
States district court in this circumstance. See id. However, Born concludes that only the
arbitrators may petition the United States district court to enforce the subpoena issued by
the arbitrators, in contrast with section 7 of the Uniform Arbitration Act and most state
laws, which allow either the arbitrators or a party to the arbitration to request judicial
enforcement of the arbitrators' subpoena. See BORN, supra note 6, at 841. See infra
notes 174 and 176 and accompanying text for discussion of section 7 of the Uniform
Arbitration Act and selected state international arbitration act provisions that address
who may apply for judicial enforcement of subpoenas issued by the arbitrators. Note
that arbitrators do not generally request judicial enforcement of subpoenas or other
discovery orders that the arbitrators have issued. Rather, the arbitrators are more likely
to draw adverse inferences from a party's refusal to produce requested documents or
witnesses. See id. at 842-43.
'
74Section 684.23(2)(a) of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides that
the arbitral tribunal or a party authorized by the tribunal may request that a Florida court
enforce subpoenas or orders issued by the arbitral tribunal for the attendance of
witnesses, the production of documents, the taking of depositions, or the obtaining of
other discovery. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(2)(a) (West, WESTLAW through 1996
2nd Reg. Sess.). Georgia law provides that either a party or the arbitrators may apply
for court enforcement of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or for the production
of documents or "other evidence" issued by arbitrators presiding over an international
arbitration subject to the Georgia arbitration legislation. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-9(a), 9-
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could question whether such judicial enforcement of subpoenas
issued by the arbitrators at the request of a party may constitute
undesirable judicial interference in the arbitral process,'75 the
provision in section 7 of the Uniform Arbitration Act allowing a
party to request court enforcement of subpoenas ordered by the
arbitrators argues against preemption of like state law provisions
applicable to international arbitrations.'76
Section 7 of the FAA does not expressly permit courts to order
discovery in aid of arbitration at the request of a party to the
arbitration.'77 Moreover, the majority of lower courts hold that
such court-ordered discovery at the request of a party is generally
improper as a matter of federal law.' Courts denying party
requests for court-ordered discovery in aid of arbitration have
reasoned that such court involvement conflicts with the FAA's
policy of limiting judicial interference in the arbitral process. 179
9-30 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.). Neither the California statutory provisions that
apply to international arbitrations conducted in California or to arbitrations generally
address expressly the enforcement of subpoenas issued by arbitrators. The relevant
statutory provisions suggest that the enforcement of subpoenas issued by arbitrators
presiding over an international arbitration subject to the California international
arbitration statute is in accordance with the provisions concerning the enforcement of
subpoenas issued by California courts. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1282.6, 1297.271,
1991-1994 (West 1996). This would appear a drafting oversight by the California
legislature.
175While Born raises this question, he does not address its proper resolution. See
BORN, supra note 6, at 847.
176See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7(a), 7 U.L.A. 114 (1985).
177See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
178See BORN, supra note 6, at 856. However, most federal courts have allowed
court-ordered discovery in aid of arbitration at the request of a party to the arbitration in
limited cases suggesting "exceptional circumstances" in which the arbitral tribunal has
not been formed or is not able to safeguard the evidence. Id. at 857.
1790ne federal district court has explained why it considers court-ordered
discovery in aid of arbitration as undesirable judicial interference in the arbitral process.
A further reason for denying discovery pending arbitration lies in the
potential for interference with the arbitral function. By retaining jurisdiction
over this action and allowing prearbitration discovery the Court would be duty
bound to administer the discovery process. In so doing, there is a likelihood
that its administration of the discovery issues could preshape the issues before
the arbitrator.
Recognition Equip., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 532 F. Supp. 271, 275 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(denying party's request that federal district court order discovery prior to arbitration
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While these court cases did not involve state laws authorizing
court-ordered discovery at the request of a party, one commentator
suggests section 7 of the FAA may preempt state law provisions
allowing state courts to order discovery at the request of a party to
an arbitration to the extent that such state laws result in sufficient
judicial interference in the arbitral process."' However, the state
international arbitration act provisions concerning court-ordered
discovery at the request of a party to an arbitration do not appear
to raise preemption concerns. Both the California and Florida
international arbitration statutes allow only a party authorized by
the arbitral tribunal to apply for state court assistance in obtaining
discovery."' Since these state statutory provisions only allow
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). However, other federal courts have
not articulated clearly why court-ordered discovery in aid of arbitration constitutes
undesirable judicial interference in the arbitral process. One federal district court
declared that court-ordered discovery at the request of a party "would interfere with a
matter entrusted by federal law to the arbitrators, without any congressional expression
reserving to the courts the power to issue, rather than merely enforce, subpoenas [as
provided in section 7 of the FAA]." Thompson v. Zavin, 607 F. Supp. 780, 783 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (holding that section 7 and the pro-arbitration policies of the FAA prevent a
federal court from ordering discovery at the request of a party to the arbitration).
Without explaining its reasoning, another federal district court declared that "in federal
courts pre-hearing examinations under court aegis in matters pending before arbitration
tribunals are unwarranted." In re the Arbitration between Commercial Solvents Corp.
and La. Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (denying party's
request to take depositions of employees of opposing party to an arbitration pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
180See BORN, supra note 6, at 858.
" Section 1297.271 of the California international arbitration statute provides in
part that "the arbitral tribunal or~a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal, may
request from the superior court assistance in taking evidence." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1297.271 (West 1996). Section 684.23(2)(b) of the Florida International Arbitration Act
authorizes a Florida circuit court "to the extent of its powers, [to] render such other
assistance" in addition to enforcing subpoenas or discovery issued by the arbitral
tribunal "including [the] issuance of letters rogatory or other requests for foreign judicial
assistance" as requested by the arbitral tribunal or a party authorized by the arbitral
tribunal. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(2)(b) (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd Reg.
Sess.). Garvey and Heffelfinger profess that federal law would not likely preempt state
law provisions allowing discovery in aid of arbitration unless such state law provisions
conflict with what they term a "treaty restricting discovery" such as the Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. Garvey & Heffelfinger,
supra note 17, at 212; Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
Hague Evidence Convention]. One could foresee a situation in which section
684.23(2)(b) of the Florida International Arbitration Act, which authorizes Florida
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court-ordered discovery at the request of a party authorized by the
arbitral tribunal to make such a request, it is difficult to conclude
that such state law provisions result in sufficient judicial
interference in the arbitral process to justify their preemption by
section 7 of the FAA.
E. Court-Ordered Provisional Measures
Delays in the formation of the arbitral tribunal as well as in the
commencement and ultimate resolution of an arbitration may
prejudice a party to an international arbitration. Such delays
enable the opposing party to dissipate or conceal its assets or to
destroy evidence pertinent to an international arbitration."2 Such
circumstances suggest the need for provisional measures to
preserve the status quo pending the resolution of the international
arbitration.'83
courts to seek foreign judicial assistance to obtain discovery in aid of arbitration, could
conflict with the Hague Evidence Convention. Article I of the Hague Evidence
Convention provides in pertinent part that a "judicial authority" of a Contracting State
may send a "letter of request" to the "competent authority" of another Contracting State
seeking assistance in obtaining evidence. Id. art. I. However, Article I of the Hague
Evidence Convention requires that such a letter of request may seek evidence "intended
for use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated." Id. Based on a literal
reading of this language, it would appear that a Florida court could violate the Hague
Evidence Convention if the court utilized the letter of request mechanism provided in
Article I of the Convention to obtain foreign judicial assistance desired by the arbitral
tribunal or a party authorized by the tribunal pursuant to section 684.23(2)(b) of the
Florida International Arbitration Act. See id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(2)(b). Note
that an official report on the Hague Evidence Convention reveals that the drafters did
not intend for Article I to include judicial assistance in obtaining evidence for
arbitration. See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission
Report on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence
Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556, 1566-67 (1989). Born comments that "there is little
authority" concerning whether an arbitral tribunal may apply to a national court in the
arbitral situs and request that the court issue a "letter of request" pursuant to the
Convention. BORN, supra note 6, at 860.
'
82See BORN, supra note 6, at 753-54; Charles N. Brower & W. Michael
Tupman, Court-Ordered Provisional Measures Under the New York Convention, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 24-25 (1986).
183Provisional measures may include attachments, injunctions, orders to post
security to satisfy a final judgment, sequestration orders or the appointment of a neutral
third party to take designated actions. One can find provisional measures also described
as provisional relief, interim relief, conservatory measures, prejudgment relief, or pre-
award relief.
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Neither chapter 1 nor chapter 2 of the FAA contains express
provisions addressing whether the arbitrators or a court may order
provisional measures in aid of arbitration.8" However, most
United States courts have recognized the authority of an arbitrator
under the FAA to order provisional measures as long as such
measures are consistent with the parties' agreement to arbitrate.' 5
Thus, state international arbitration act provisions authorizing the
arbitral tribunal to order provisional measures do not appear to
raise preemption concerns." 6
However, since the need for provisional relief may arise prior
"
84While the FAA is silent generally on the granting of provisional measures,
section 8 of the FAA provides a specific exception that authorizes the court to order pre-
award attachment of a vessel in a maritime dispute. Section 8 of the FAA provides in
pertinent part: "If the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in
admiralty, then . . . the party claiming to be aggrieved may begin his proceeding
hereunder by libel and seizure of the vessel or other property of the other party
according to the usual course of admiralty proceedings ... " 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1994).
'
81See BORN, supra note 6, at 760. U.S. courts have acknowledged that
arbitrators have the authority to order attachment and particular injunctive relief,
although it is not clear whether arbitrators may order other types of provisional
measures. See Neil E. McDonell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in International
Commercial Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273, 283 (1984). Since the
parties' arbitration agreement will not often hddress expressly the power of an arbitrator
to order provisional measures, institutional arbitral rules will establish the arbitrator's
authority to grant provisional relief in many cases. See BORN, supra note 6, at 761. For
discussion concerning how the choice of particular institutional arbitral rules may affect
the availability of provisional relief, see McDonell, supra, at 290-95. However, while
the rules of most international arbitral regimes authorize a tribunal to order provisional
measures, such arbitral rules do not endow a tribunal with executory authority to enforce
an order for provisional measures against the assets of one of the parties. See Brower &
Tupman, supra note 182, at 24.
186Section 684.16(1) of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides in
pertinent part that at the request of a party the arbitral tribunal may order such interim
relief as it considers appropriate. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.16(1). Section 1297.171
of the California international arbitration statute authorizes the arbitral tribunal, at the
request of a party to order any interim measure of protection the tribunal "may consider.
necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute," unless the parties have agreed
otherwise. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.171. Section 9-9-35 of the Georgia Code
provides that the arbitrators may grant interim relief that they consider appropriate. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-35 (LEXIS through 1996 Supp.). While it does not appear that'
federal law preempts state law provisions authorizing arbitral awards of provisional
relief, arbitral awards of provisional measures are subject to judicial review by U.S.
courts. For commentary on the standards of judicial review of arbitral awards ordering
provisional measures in U.S. courts, see BORN, supra note 6, at 819-23.
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to the appointment and constitution of the arbitral tribunal,
obtaining provisional measures from the arbitrators is often not
feasible. While the FAA does not expressly address the
availability of court-ordered provisional measures in aid of
arbitration, U.S. courts have derived judicial power to order
provisional measures when it was impractical for a party to obtain
provisional measures from the arbitral tribunal.'87
Conversely, some U.S. courts have interpreted Article 11(3) of
the New York Convention as prohibiting courts from ordering pre-
award attachments in aid of arbitration.188 Provisions contained in
the state international arbitration statutes examined authorize the
respective state courts to order pre-award attachments in aid of an
international arbitration subject to the state statute."9  If the
applicable court precedent in a particular case holds that Article
187For example, federal courts have invoked Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
81(a)(3) and 64 as a basis for ordering attachment in aid of arbitration. See McDonell,
supra note 185, at 280-81. Federal courts have applied general standards for obtaining
preliminary injunctions when authorizing court-ordered injunctions in aid of
international arbitration. See, e.g., Rogers, Burgun, Shahine & Deschler, Inc. v.
Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying the standard for
issuing a preliminary injunction established in the Second Circuit and granting a
preliminary injunction in aid of a pending international arbitration).
18'See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
89Section 1297.91 of the California international arbitration statute provides
that "it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request from a
[California] superior court, before or during the arbitral proceedings, an interim measure
of protection, or for the court to grant such a measure." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1297.91. Section 1297.93 of the California international arbitration statute provides that
a California superior court may order attachment in connection with a pending
arbitration "to assure that the award.., is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of
party assets." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.93(a). Section 684.23(3) of the Florida
International Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part that a Florida court, in response
to a request by the arbitral tribunal or a party authorized by the arbitral tribunal, may
grant any interim relief including attachments that the court "is empowered by law to
grant." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(3). Section 684.23(4) allows a party to an arbitration
subject to the Florida International Arbitration Act to request interim relief directly from
Florida courts provided that such interim relief will not be granted "unless the moving
party shows that an application to the arbitral tribunal for that relief would prejudice the
party's rights and that interim relief from the court is necessary to protect those rights."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(4). Section 9-9-35 of the Georgia Code, which specifically
applies to international arbitrations, provides in pertinent part that a party to an
arbitration may request interim relief directly from a court, inside or outside of Georgia.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-35.
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1(3) of the New York Convention prohibits a court from ordering
pre-award attachment prior to a pending arbitration, then one could
argue that the New York Convention would preempt a state law
provision permitting such court-ordered attachment. 9' However,
this article argues that pre-award attachment, as well as other
provisional measures ordered by a court in connection with a
pending arbitration, will in most instances further the arbitral
process.'9 ' This conclusion suggests that in most cases the New
York Convention should not preempt state international arbitration
act provisions authorizing courts to order pre-award attachments.
Moreover, provisions contained in state international
arbitration statutes also authorize their respective state courts to
order preliminary injunctions in aid of an arbitration subject to the
state international arbitration statute. '92 U.S. courts have reached
different conclusions concerning whether they have authority
under chapter 1 of the FAA to order injunctive relief in aid of
arbitration, and if so, the particular circumstances when a court
190 See BORN, supra note 6, at 798. As discussed previously, state international
arbitration statutes may apply to an arbitration agreement resulting in a "nondomestic"
award under the New York Convention. See supra note 68. However, since state
international arbitration statutes do not contain provisions that enforce agreements to
arbitrate abroad, state international arbitration statutes do not apply to agreements to
arbitrate covered by the New York Convention resulting in a foreign award rendered in
the territory of another signatory to the Convention. See id. Thus, the author concludes
that the New York Convention may only preempt state international arbitration act
provisions that concern provisional measures when the arbitration agreement could
result in a nondomestic award under the Convention.
191This position follows the view of the majority of U.S. courts as well as the
prevailing view among commentators that pre-award attachment ordered by courts is
consistent with the text and purposes of the New York Convention. See infra notes 207-
13 and accompanying text.
'
92Section 684.23(3) of the Florida International Arbitration Act authorizes a
Florida court to grant preliminary injunctions in aid of an international arbitration
subject to the Florida statute to the extent the court "is empowered by law" and "subject
to such procedural requirements and other conditions as would apply in a comparable
action not pertaining to an arbitration." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.23(3). Section
1297.93(b) of the California international arbitration statute provides that a California
court may grant a preliminary injunction "to protect trade secrets or to conserve goods
which are the subject matter of the arbitral dispute" in aid of a pending arbitration. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.93(b). While section 9-9-35 of the Georgia Code authorizes a
party to request interim relief directly from a court, inside or outside of Georgia, the
provision does not specify the forms that court-ordered provisional measures may
assume. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-35.
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may grant such an injunction.'93 One commentator suggests that if
the applicable court precedent establishes that chapter 1 of the
FAA prohibits a court from ordering a preliminary injunction in
aid of an arbitration, then chapter 1 of the FAA would preempt a
state international arbitration act provision authorizing the
respective state court to issue such a preliminary injunction.'94
This article contends that court decisions holding that chapter 1 of
the FAA precludes a court from ordering a preliminary injunction
in aid of arbitration or places significant restrictions on the
issuance of such injunctions conflict with the FAA's pro-
arbitration policies. Accordingly, if such case law were
applicable, then preemption of state statutory provisions
authorizing a court to order a preliminary injunction in aid of
arbitration would not be justified.'95
193See BORN, supra note 6, at 794-95. Describing some of the different holdings
of U.S. courts concerning whether a court has the power to grant injunctive relief to
maintain the status quo prior to an arbitration, one commentator states that
some courts have held that courts have no power under the Federal Arbitration
Act to issue an injunction. Others have concluded that courts have the power,
but that an injunction would be appropriate only if the contract contained a
provision for injunctive relief pending arbitration. Others would grant
injunctive relief only if the plaintiff had a substantial likelihood of winning its
dispute before the arbitrators.
Philip E. Karmel, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act: A
Perspective from Contract Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1373, 1374 (1987). For discussion
of the disparate case law addressing the authority of courts under chapter 1 of the FAA
to order preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration, see id. at 1374-86.
194See BORN, supra note 6, at 798.
195Born also suggests if the applicable court precedent in a particular case
establishes that a court has the authority under chapter 1 of the FAA to order a
preliminary injunction only in certain circumstances, then such a restrictive legal
standard would suggest preemption of state law provisions granting their respective state
courts wider latitude to order a preliminary injunction in aid of an arbitration subject to
the state international arbitration statute. See id. It is beyond the scope of this study to
discuss the varying standards concerning the availability of court-ordered injunctive
relief in aid of arbitration under chapter 1 of the FAA, and the possible preemption
questions that could arise when provisions contained in state international arbitration
statutes allow state courts to order preliminary injunctions without the restrictions
established under case law.
This part discusses the general body of case law addressing the authority of
courts to order pre-award attachments under Article 11(3) of the New York Convention
and to order preliminary injunctions under chapter 1 of the FAA. This study does not
attempt to discuss the binding case law that would apply if a court were to address
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The New York Convention does not provide expressly for
court-ordered provisional measures. However, some U.S. courts
have held that Article 11(3) of the Convention prohibits courts
from ordering pre-award attachments in aid of arbitration.'96 In
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A.,' 97 the Third Circuit
held that Article 1(3) of the Convention deprives a U.S. court of
jurisdiction to order pre-award attachment in aid of arbitration.9 '
The Third Circuit reasoned that a judicial action of attachment
prior to the issuance of an arbitral award would violate the parties'
agreement to arbitrate.' 99 The McCreary court declared that the
complaint requesting the lower court to order pre-award
attachment "seeks to bypass the agreed upon method of settling
disputes," and thus the party requesting attachment had attempted
to circumvent the arbitral process.2 ° The Third Circuit concluded
that "[t]he Convention forbids the courts of a contracting state
whether the New York Convention or chapter 1 of the FAA may preempt the California,
Florida, and Georgia state statutory provisions at issue.
This part addresses the possible preemption of state international arbitration act
provisions authorizing state courts to order pre-award attachments or preliminary
injunctions. Some state international arbitration statutes also authorize their respective
state courts to order other types of provisional measures in aid of arbitration. For
example, section 684.23(3) of the Florida International Arbitration Act expressly
authorizes Florida courts to grant temporary restraining orders, garnishments, or writs of
replevin which the Florida court "is empowered by law to grant." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
684.23(3). Section 1567.39(c) of the North Carolina international arbitration statute
authorizes the respective state court -to grant an order for claim or delivery, the
appointment of a receiver, and the delivery of money or other property into court as well
as authorizes the respective state court to order attachments and preliminary injunctions.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.39(c) (1996). However, the author chooses not to address
whether provisional measures other than pre-award attachments and preliminary
injunctions may be preempted since it does not appear that existing case law raises
preemption questions in these areas.
196Article 11(3) of the New York Convention provides that "the court of a
Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties
have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." New York Convention, supra
note 5, art. 11(3).
197501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974).
198See id. at 1038.
199See id.
200id.
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from entertaining a suit that violates an agreement to arbitrate." ''
In Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A. ,20 the New York
Court of Appeals, the state's highest appellate court, also held that
Article H(3) of the New York Convention deprives a U.S. court of
jurisdiction to order pre-award attachment in aid of arbitration.2 3
The court viewed the complaint requesting the lower court to order
pre-award attachment as an attempt to circumvent the arbitral
24process.2° In dicta, the Cooper court implied that Article HI(3) of
the New York Convention prohibited courts from ordering pre-
award attachments intended to further as well as frustrate the
arbitral process. The New York Court of Appeals declared that
"[t]he purpose and policy of the UN Convention [on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards] will be
best carried out by restricting prearbitration judicial action to
determining whether arbitration should be compelled."2 5 Several
New York cases subsequent to Cooper have followed Cooper's
reasoning and have held that Article H(3) of the New York
Convention prohibits a court from ordering pre-award attachments
not intended to frustrate the arbitral process.2°6
20 1Id.; Accord I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir.
1981) (attachment action not in aid of arbitration contrary to the parties' agreement to
arbitrate and the New York Convention).
20257 N.Y.2d 408, 456 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1982).
20357 N.Y.2d at 414,456 N.Y.S. 2d at 731.
2
°4"[T]he instant case, is nothing more than plaintiff's attempt to circumvent
Special Term's ruling . . . denying the stay of arbitration." 57 N.Y.2d at 415, 456
N.Y.S.2d at 732.
20557 N.Y.2d at 416,456 N.Y.S. at 732.
2
°6See'Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App.
Div. 1988); Shah v. Eastern Silk Indus., Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150 (App. Div. 1985);
Faberge Int'l, Inc. v. DiPino, 491 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1985). In 1985, the New
York Legislature amended its state arbitration statute. by enacting a provision
authorizing court-ordered provisional measures. Section 7502(c) of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules authorizes a New York supreme court (trial court) to order an
attachment or a preliminary injunction "in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but
only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be
rendered ineffectual without such provisional relief." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 7502(c). While the legislative history of the amendment does not clearly reveal the
drafters' intentions, some commentators have suggested that section 7502(c) may
overturn Cooper. See Curtis E. Pew & Robert M. Jarvis, Pre-Award Attachment in
International Arbitration: The Law in New York, 7:3 J. INT'L ARB. 31, 35 (1990).
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However, most U.S. courts have held that Article II(3) of the
New York Convention does not preclude a court from ordering
pre-award attachment in aid of arbitration. The seminal case
professing the majority view is Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
Uranex"' in which the District Court of the Northern District of
California declared that "this court will not follow the reasoning of
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A..... .There is no
indication in either the text or the apparent policies of the
Convention that resort to prejudgment attachment was to be
precluded."2 8 The Uranex court also emphasized that chapter 1 of
the FAA does not prohibit pre-award attachment ordered by a
court, and thus the similar operation of provisions contained in
chapter 1 of the FAA and the New York Convention supports a
conclusion that the New York Convention does not prohibit a
court from ordering pre-award attachment.2  Most lower courts
have followed the rationale of Uranex.21
The McCreary and Cooper decisions are in most respects
based on misinterpretations of the New York Convention. The
McCreary and Cooper decisions prohibit court-ordered attachment
in part based on both courts' opposition to judicial action ordering
pre-award attachment that frustrates the arbitral process. This
position would appear consistent with the New York
However, a New York intermediate appellate court has ruled that section 7502(c) does
not extend to cases falling under the New York Convention, thus recognizing the
continued applicability of Cooper after enactment of section 7502(c). See Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51.
207451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D.Cal. 1977).
208Id. at 1052.
21 See id. at 1051. Commentators profess that it is clear that pre-award
attachment ordered by a court is available under chapter 1 of the FAA. See Brower &
Tupman, supra note 182, at 27. In Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.,
Judge Learned Hand writing for the Second Circuit recognized that pre-award
attachment ordered by a court promotes the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration
and enforcement of arbitral awards. Hand acknowledged that pre-award attachment "is
entirely consistent with a desire to make as effective as possible recovery upon awards,
after they have been made, which is what provisional remedies do." Murray Oil Prods.
Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1944).
21
"The weight of lower US court authority" follows the result in Uranex.
BORN, supra note 6, at 782. See, e.g., Filanto S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F.
Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Convention .21  However, dictum in Cooper professes that Article
1(3) of the New York Convention prohibits court-ordered
attachment at the pre-award stage intended by the party requesting
the attachment to support the international arbitration.
12
Commentators view this position of the Cooper court as a
misinterpretation of Article 11(3) of the New York Convention and
as threatening to the arbitral process."'
The position expressed by the majority of U.S. courts and
commentators suggests a possible standard concerning the
circumstances in which Article 11(3) of the New York Convention
may preempt state international arbitration act provisions
authorizing a court to order pre-award attachment. Article 11(3)
should preempt such state law provisions when the party
requesting the court to order pre-award attachment intended the
judicial action of attachment to frustrate or circumvent the arbitral
process. On the other hand, Article 11(3) should not preempt state
law provisions authorizing pre-award attachments intended to aid
an international arbitration. Whether a party requesting a pre-
award attachment intended such provisional relief to aid or to
frustrate the arbitration depends on the specific facts in the
particular case.214  Other commentators suggest a similar
211See Lawrence F. Ebb, Flight of Assets from the Jurisdiction "In the Twinkling
of a Telex": Pre- and Post-Award Conservatory Relief in International Commercial
Arbitrations, 7:1 J. INT'L ARB. 9, 12 (1990); BoRN, supra note 6, at 783.
212See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
213"As a general proposition, it is almost certainly based on a misinterpretation
of Article II, paragraph 3 of the New York Convention." Ebb, supra note 211, at 13.
"The Cooper rationale threatens, rather than furthers, the arbitral process, by denying
what is often the only realistic means of preserving the status quo." BORN, supra note 6,
at 782. Other commentators profess that the notion expressed in McCreary and Cooper
of the undesirability of any judicial involvement in the arbitral process is contrary to the
intent of the New York Convention. See Brower & Tupman, supra note 182, at 33.
Brower & Tupman declare that "the underlying rationale of both McCreary and Cooper
rests upon misapprehension of the principle that the 'essence of arbitration is resolving
disputes without the interference of the judicial process and its strictures."' Id. (quoting
Cooper, 57 N.Y.2d at 416,456 N.Y.S.2d at 729).
214Boin comments that whether a request for pre-award attachment is "in aid" of
arbitration rather than an attempt to circumvent the arbitration depends on "the timing of
the request, the availability of provisional relief from the arbitrators, the extent to which
provisional measures will effectively resolve the underlying dispute, and the hardship
suffered by the parties." BoRN, supra note 6, at 785.
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preemption standard.215
While federal courts have assumed widely divergent positions
concerning when a United States district court has the authority
under chapter 1 of the FAA to issue a preliminary injunction
maintaining the status quo in aid of an arbitration, some federal
courts have forbidden the issuance of such injunctions or have
formulated restrictive standards for their issuance.216 If the
applicable court precedent in a particular case establishes that
chapter 1 of the FAA prohibits a court from ordering a preliminary
injunction in aid of arbitration or places significant restrictions on
the issuance of such injunctions, then chapter 1 of the FAA would
appear to preempt state international arbitration act provisions
authorizing the issuance of such preliminary injunctions not
subject to the restrictions imposed by case law."7
However, case law holding that chapter 1 of the FAA prohibits
or places significant restrictions on the issuance of preliminary
injunctions in aid of arbitration would appear at odds with the pro-
arbitration policies of the FAA. In Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch,
215 While not addressing whether the New York Convention may preempt state
law provisions, the Washington Foreign Law Society Report suggests that chapter 1 of
the FAA will not preempt state law provisions authorizing prejudgment attachment and
interim relief which promote arbitration. The Washington Foreign Law Society Report
states that
in other areas of potential court oversight and intervention [other than sections
3 and 4 of the FAA], such as prejudgment attachment and interim relief, states
should be permitted to enforce such provisions so long as they promote
arbitration which would normally be the case. If, however, any such provision
undermines the ability of a party to seek arbitration in a contract involving a
maritime transaction or a transaction in interstate commerce that provision
would be preempted by federal law.
Washington Foreign Law Society Report, supra note 27, at 325 n.94. While not
expressly articulating a preemption standard, Born makes conclusions concerning the
proper application of Article 11(3) of the New York Convention to the question of pre-
award attachments ordered by a court which are similar to the preemption standard
formulated by the author. See BORN, supra note 6, at 785.
216For example, the Eighth Circuit overturned the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction, because the parties did not provide specifically for such relief in
their contract. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286,
1291-92 (8th Cir. 1984).
217See supra note 194.
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Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,28 the Second Circuit declared that
the FAA's pro-arbitration policies "are furthered, not weakened,
by a rule permitting a district court to preserve the meaningfulness
of the arbitration through a preliminary injunction. Arbitration can
become a 'hollow formality' if parties are able to alter irreversibly
the status quo before the arbitrators are able to render a decision in
the dispute."2 9  The Second Circuit also professed that "[t]he
issuance of an injunction to preserve the status quo pending
arbitration fulfills the court's obligation under the FAA to enforce
a valid agreement to arbitrate.""22  Thus, if such case law, in
conflict with the FAA's pro-arbitration policies, were applicable,
then preemption of state international arbitration act provisions
authorizing the issuance of preliminary injunctions, not subject to
the restrictions required by case law, would not appear justified.
F. Authority ofArbitral Tribunal to Decide Questions of
Scope and Validity ofArbitration Agreement
The power or competence of an arbitral tribunal depends on (1)
the validity of the arbitration clause and (2) the scope of the
arbitration clause that establishes the disputed issues subject to
arbitration.22" ' While the FAA does not address expressly whether
the arbitral tribunal or the courts may resolve these questions,
Supreme Court precedent establishes that with regard to cases
subject to the FAA, the arbitrators do not have the authority in
most instances to resolve disputes concerning the validity or scope
of an arbitration agreement, but rather such questions require
judicial resolution in most cases.2 2 However, provisions contained
in the state international arbitration statutes examined authorize
the arbitral tribunal to rule on questions of the validity and scope
218910 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1990).
219Id. at 1053.
2201d. at 1054.
221See Hans Smit, Elements of International Arbitration in the United States, 1
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 64, 67 (1990).
1 2 See infra note 243 for discussion of Supreme Court precedent holding that
courts must resolve disputes concerning the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement. For discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in First Options of Chicago
v. Kaplan revealing the specific circumstances when arbitrators may decide questions of
the scope of an arbitration clause, see infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
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of an arbitration clause.223
As discussed below, the FAA's purpose of enforcing
arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms and the
parties' intentions, which underlies the Supreme Court's holding
in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,224 suggests that the
FAA should preempt state law provisions authorizing the arbitral
tribunal to rule on questions of the scope of an arbitration clause,
when such state law provisions are mandatory provisions from
which the parties cannot derogate or default provisions that the
arbitrators may apply in the absence of contractual agreement by
the parties on the matter.225 However, the Kaplan decision does
not suggest that the FAA should preempt state law provisions
authorizing the arbitrators to decide questions of the scope of an
arbitration clause, when the parties agree expressly to confer such
power on the arbitral tribunal pursuant to a discretionary state law
provision.
In addition, Supreme Court precedent holding that a court must
resolve questions of the validity of an arbitration agreement226
suggests that the FAA may preempt state law provisions
authorizing the arbitral tribunal to rule on the validity of an
arbitration agreement, when such state law provisions establish
mandatory or default rules. However, this article contends that the
Supreme Court's support for enforcing arbitration agreements
according to their terms in Kaplan and other recent cases suggests
that the FAA may not preempt state law provisions allowing the
parties to agree expressly that the arbitral tribunal has the authority
to rule on questions of the validity of the arbitration agreement.
The California and Florida international arbitration statutes
223See infra notes 227 and 242 and accompanying text.
224115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995). For discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Kaplan, see infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
225
"Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the
parties contract around them." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
Mandatory or "[i]mmutable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the
parties attempt to contract around them." Id.
226See infra note 243 for discussion of Supreme Court precedent holding that
courts must resolve disputes concerning the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement.
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contain provisions that authorize the arbitral tribunal to rule on
questions of arbitrability.2" As discussed below, the California
statute appears to create a mandatory rule from which the parties
cannot derogate.228 On the other hand, the Florida statute seems to
create a default rule that the arbitrators may apply as well as a
discretionary rule that allows the parties to confer on the arbitral
tribunal the authority to decide questions of arbitrability.229
The California and Florida statutory provisions authorizing the
arbitral tribunal to rule on questions of arbitrability appear to
conflict in most respects with the Supreme Court's recent
unanimous decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.23
In a domestic arbitration subject to chapter 1 of the FAA, the
Supreme Court held in Kaplan that the agreement of the parties
determines whether the arbitral tribunal or a court has the primary
authority to decide questions of arbitrability. 231  If the parties
I
227Section 684.06(2) of the Florida International Arbitration Act provides in
pertinent part that the arbitral tribunal "shall have the power to rule on all challenges to
its jurisdiction" including "challenges asserting that the dispute is not within the scope
of the questions referable to arbitration." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.06(2) (West,
WESTLAW through 1996 2nd Reg. Sess.). Provisions in the California state
international arbitration statute provide that the arbitral tribunal "may" rule on a plea
that the tribunal "is exceeding the scope of its authority." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
1297.163, 1297.165 (West 1996). Note that the Georgia statutory provision that
concerns the power of arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction in international
arbitrations subject to the Georgia statute does not expressly authorize the arbitrators to
decide questions of arbitrability. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-34 (LEXIS through 1995
Supp.). The author uses the term "questions of arbitrability" to refer to questions
concerning the scope of an arbitration clause since the Supreme Court in Kaplan utilizes
this term in its opinion.
22 S5ee infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text for discussion of the
mandatory rule authorizing the arbitral tribunal to decide questions of arbitrability
created by the California statute and the possible preemption of this mandatory rule by
the FAA.
229See infra note 240 and accompanying text for discussion of the Florida
statute's default rule that allows the arbitrators to determine that they have the authority
to decide questions of arbitrability in certain cases when the parties have not provided
expressly for this result. The author contends that the FAA may preempt this default
rule. See text infra. See infra note 241 and accompanying text for comment on the
Florida statute which may authorize the parties to agree expressly that the arbitrators
have the power to decide questions of arbitrability.
23 0115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
231See id. at 1923. The Court stated that "[j]ust as the arbitrability of the merits
of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.., so the
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agreed to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators, then a
court reviewing the arbitrators' decision will apply a deferential
standard of review, which gives "considerable leeway to the
arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow
circumstances." '232 However, the Supreme Court emphasized that
courts should not find the parties to have agreed to submit
questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators unless there is "'clear
and unmistakable' evidence that they did so."233  If clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' agreement to submit
arbitrability questions to the arbitrators does not exist, then a court
must decide arbitrability questions independently without special
deference to a ruling by the arbitrators on the matter.3
While ruling that the arbitrators do not have the authority to
decide arbitrability questions absent "clear and unmistakable"
evidence that the parties agreed to confer such power on the
arbitrators, the Kaplan court emphasized that its holding was
consistent with the purposes of the FAA articulated by the Court
in prior cases. The Court professed that its holding in Kaplan
stems from the fact that under the FAA, "arbitration is simply a
matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those
question 'who has the primary power to decide arbitrability' turns upon what the parties
agreed about the matter." Id.
2321d
"
233 d. at 1924 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475
U.S. 643, 649, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418-1419 (1986)). The Kaplan Court found that "clear
and unmistakable" evidence of the parties agreement to submit arbitrability questions to
the arbitrators must exist in order for the arbitrators to decide arbitrability questions.
The Court reasoned that
[a] party often might not focus upon that question or upon the significance
of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers ... [G]iven the
principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it
specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand why
courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the "who should
decide arbitrability" point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so
might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably
would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.
Id. at 1925.
234See id. at 1924. If "the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability
question itself to arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would
decide any other question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely
independently." Id.
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disputes-but only those disputes--that the parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration., 23 In Kaplan, the court also suggested that
its holding furthered the FAA's purpose of "ensur[ing] that
commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts 'are
enforced according to their terms'. and according to the
intentions of the parties. 236
In cases in which a federal statute is silent on a particular
matter, the federal statute may nevertheless preempt state law
provisions that frustrate the objectives of the federal law.237 The
FAA does not contain a provision addressing whether the
arbitrators or the courts may rule on arbitrability questions.
However, this article contends that the Kaplan Court's support, in
the context of the arbitrators' authority to decide questions of
arbitrability, for the FAA's purpose of ensuring that arbitrations
proceed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, suggests
that the FAA may preempt state law provisions authorizing
arbitrators to rule on questions of arbitrability where it is not clear
that the parties intended such a result.
The California statutory provisions that authorize an arbitral
tribunal to decide questions of arbitrability appear to create a
mandatory rule from which the parties cannot derogate.238  The
mandatory rule created by the California international arbitration
statute, which conflicts with the Supreme Court's holding in
Kaplan, authorizes an arbitral tribunal to decide questions of
arbitrability in the absence of "clear and unmistakable evidence"
that the parties have agreed to submit such questions to the
arbitrators. The FAA's purpose of ensuring that arbitrations
235 d. at 1924 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1212, 1216-1217 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 837-
838 (1995)).
236Id. at 1925 (citing Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1214 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at
479, 109 S. Ct. at 1256)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353 (1985).
237See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
238As stated earlier, sections 1297.163 and 1297.165 when read together provide
that an arbitral tribunal "may" rule on a plea that the tribunal "is exceeding the scope of
its authority." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.163, 1297.165 (West 1996). No
provision in the California international arbitration statute indicates that the parties may
derogate from the rule created by sections 1297.163 and 1297.165.
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proceed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, which the
Court invokes as a basis for its decision in Kaplan, would appear
to support preemption of such a mandatory state law provision
authorizing the arbitral tribunal to rule on arbitrability questions in
a case where it is not clear that the parties intended to confer such
power on the arbitrators.239
The Florida International Arbitration Act provision authorizing
the arbitral tribunal to rule on questions of arbitrability may
operate as a default rule that grants the arbitral tribunal the power
to decide arbitrability questions without the parties' intending this
result.2' Since these default rules authorize the arbitral tribunal to
rule on arbitrability questions when the parties have not agreed to
confer such power on the arbitrators, the FAA's purpose of
ensuring that arbitrations proceed pursuant to the clearly expressed
agreement of the parties, articulated by the Court in Kaplan, would
support preemption of these default rules created by the Florida
International Arbitration Act.
However, based on Kaplan, it would appear that the FAA
should not preempt state law provisions allowing the parties to
agree that the arbitral tribunal has the authority to rule on
questions of arbitrability, when circumstances indicate that this
239As discussed throughout this study, chapter 1 of the FAA may preempt a
provision contained in state international arbitration statute only if the arbitration
agreement falls within the scope of both the pertinent state international arbitration
statute and chapter 1 of the FAA.
2
'Section 684.06(2) of the Florida statute, which authorizes an arbitral tribunal
to rule on questions of arbitrability, is contained in part II of the Florida International
Arbitration Act. Sections 684.05(2) and 684.05(3) provide two situations when part II
may apply to an arbitration within the scope of the Florida International Arbitration Act
when the parties have not agreed expressly or impliedly that part II shall apply. Section
684.05(2) provides that part II shall apply if "[in the absence of a choice of law
provision applicable to the written undertaking to arbitrate, that undertaking forms part
of a contract the interpretation of which is to be governed by the law of this state
[Florida]." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.05(2) (West, WESTLAW through 1996 2nd Reg.
Sess.). Section 684.05(3) provides that in any case not covered by section 684.05(1)
[which requires that the arbitration agreement contain an express provision that part II
apply or that "the parties otherwise agree" that Florida law shall apply] or section
684.05(2), then the arbitral tribunal, applying conflict of law principles, may determine
that Florida law shall govern the conduct of the arbitration. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
684.05(3). Sections 684.05(2) and 684.05(3) are default rules, for they authorize the
arbitrators to rule on questions of arbitrability when the parties did not agree to confer
such power upon the arbitrators.
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was the clear intent of the parties. While it is not entirely clear,
the Florida International Arbitration Act provision may apply in
this manner. 4'
Provisions contained in the state international arbitration
statutes examined also authorize the arbitral tribunal to rule on
questions of the validity of the arbitration agreement. 4 ' However,
Supreme Court precedent professes that the courts must resolve
disputes concerning the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement and that an arbitral tribunal may not decide such
matters. 3  This apparent conflict between these state law
241 Section 684.06(2) of the Florida statute, which authorizes an arbitral tribunal
to decide arbitrability questions, is included in part II of the Florida International
Arbitration Act. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.06(2). Section 684.05(1) provides that part
II shall apply to an arbitration within the scope of the Florida International Arbitration
Act if "the written undertaking to arbitrate expressly provides, or the parties otherwise
agree" that Florida law shall apply. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.06(1). If the parties have
agreed expressly or impliedly that Florida law should apply to their arbitration, then the
application of section 684.05(1) could authorize the. arbitral tribunal to rule on
arbitrability questions pursuant to section 684.06(2) in accordance with the parties'
intentions, if by agreeing to apply Florida law the parties intended that section 684.06(2)
would apply. However, to satisfy the "clear and unmistakable" evidence standard
required by the Kaplan Court, it would appear that the parties' arbitration agreement
would need to expressly state that the parties intend for the arbitrators to decide
arbitrability questions. Note that section 684.07(1) of the Florida statute provides that
the parties may agree in writing to conduct the arbitration in accordance with such rules
as they may select. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.07(1). However, based on these
provisions, the express or implied agreement of the parties that Florida law shall apply
to the arbitration could also authorize the arbitrators to rule on arbitrability questions
when this was not the intent of the parties. In this circumstance, it would appear that the
FAA would preempt section 684.06(2) which authorizes an arbitral tribunal to rule on
questions of arbitrability.
242 Provisions in the California, Georgia, and Florida statutes authorize the
arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction, including objections concerning the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1297.16 1; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.06(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-34 (LEXIS 1996 Supp.).
2431n Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that a claim alleging fraud in the procurement of the arbitration agreement was for
judicial resolution and was not arbitrable. 374 U.S. 167, 171 (1963). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Black declared that "fraud in the procurement of an arbitration contract
... makes it void and unenforceable and that this question of fraud is a judicial one,
which must be determined by a court." Id. at 172 (Black, J., concurring). In dicta, the
Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. reaffirmed
its holding in Moseley by declaring that "if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself... the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it." Prima Paint
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provisions and Supreme Court precedent questions whether the
FAA may preempt state law provisions authorizing an arbitral
tribunal to rule on questions of the existence or validity of an
arbitration agreement.
While the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kaplan does not
directly address whether arbitrators may decide questions of the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, this article
contends that Kaplan may suggest a possible preemption analysis
similar to the approach discussed above applied to state law
provisions that authorize an arbitral tribunal to rule on arbitrability
questions. The California and Georgia statutory provisions
authorizing an arbitral tribunal to rule on questions of the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement appear to create
mandatory rules from which the parties cannot derogate.244 Based.
on the FAA's purpose of ensuring that arbitrations proceed in
accordance with the parties' intent articulated by the Court in
Kaplan, the FAA would appear to preempt these mandatory state
law provisions authorizing the arbitral tribunal to rule on questions
of the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, if the
circumstances indicate that the parties did not intend to confer this
authority on the arbitrators. Moreover, the Florida International
Arbitration Act provision authorizing an arbitral tribunal to rule on
questions of the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement
may function as a default rule that enables the arbitral tribunal to
decide these questions without the parties intending to confer this
power on the arbitrators.245 In such circumstances, it would appear
that the FAA may preempt this provision in the Florida statute.
G. Conclusions
While provisions contained in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA also
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,403-04 (1967).
244Section 1297.161 of the California international arbitration statute and section
9-9-34 of the Georgia Code, which authorize an arbitral tribunal to decide questions of
the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, appear to create mandatory rules
since neither state statute indicates that the parties may derogate from the effect of these
provisions. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.161; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-34.
245 Section 684.06(2) of the Florida statute authorizes an arbitral tribunal to
decide questions of the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 684.06(2). For discussion concerning how section 684.06(2) may apply as a
default rule, see supra note 241.
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address the nature of judicial involvement in these areas, a state
court may invoke state international arbitration act provisions in
order to enforce agreements to arbitrate international disputes
within the respective state, to confirm international arbitral awards
rendered in the particular state, and to grant or deny enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards to the extent that chapter 1 or 2 of the
FAA does not preempt these state statutory provisions. This part
reveals that most of the state law provisions examined concerning
court orders to enforce arbitration agreements, to confirm or vacate
international arbitral awards, or to grant or refuse the recognition
or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are sufficiently similar to
the corresponding FAA provisions to suggest that the pertinent
FAA provision should not preempt such a state law provision.
However, a few of the state law provisions examined concerning
matters addressed expressly by provisions in chapter 1 or 2 of the
FAA could provide broader bases to limit the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement, to deny the confirmation of an international
arbitral award rendered in the United States, or to refuse the
recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, if a state
court interpreted such a state law provision broadly. A federal or
state appellate court should rule that the pertinent provision in
chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA preempts such a state law provision
when a state court decision invoking the state law provision
frustrates the enforceability of an arbitration agreement or the
confirmation or enforcement of an arbitral award that the FAA
would enforce or confirm.
While analysis of the possible preemption of state law
provisions concerning matters not addressed expressly in chapter 1
or 2 of the FAA is less straightforward than analysis of preemption
questions when corresponding FAA provisions exist, the FAA or
the New York Convention may preempt such a state law provision
when application of the state law provision would serve to
frustrate or undermine a purpose or policy of the FAA or the New
York Convention. Determinations concerning whether application
of a state law provision defeats a purpose or policy of the FAA or
the New York Convention depend ultimately on the particular
factual circumstances in a given case.
However, this part reveals that state international arbitration
act provisions authorizing state courts to order discovery, pre-
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award attachments, and preliminary injunctions in aid of
arbitration do not appear to frustrate articulated purposes or
policies underlying the FAA or the New York Convention, and
thus, do not seem to raise significant preemption concerns. A
court would have difficulty concluding that the state law
provisions examined that allow court-ordered discovery in aid of
arbitration at the request of a party to an arbitration conflict with
the FAA's policy of limiting judicial interference in the arbitral
process, since these state law provisions only authorize a state
court to order such discovery if the arbitral tribunal has authorized
the party to make such a request. Moreover, the prevailing view
among U.S. courts and commentators suggests that the New York
Convention should only preempt state law provisions authorizing a
state court to issue pre-award attachment when the party
requesting such court-ordered attachment intended the judicial
action to frustrate or circumvent the arbitration. Absent such
intent by the requesting party, the application of state law
provisions allowing state courts to order pre-award attachment
would not conflict with the purposes or policies underlying the
New York Convention, and thus, would not result in preemption
by the New York Convention. In addition, since state law
provisions allowing state courts to issue preliminary injunctions in
aid of an international arbitration appear to further the pro-
arbitration policies of the FAA, courts should not find that the
FAA's chapter 1 preempts state law provisions authorizing the
issuance of such preliminary injunctions.
While the FAA does not contain a provision addressing
whether the arbitrators may rule on questions involving the scope
or validity of an arbitration agreement, this article argues that
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Kaplan, the FAA may
preempt state law provisions authorizing arbitrators to rule on such
questions where it is unclear that the parties intended to confer
such power on the arbitrators.24 Thus, whether chapter 1 of the
24 The Kaplan decision holds expressly that an arbitrator may not decide
questions of the scope of an arbitration agreement unless there is clear and unmistakable
evidence that the parties have authorized the arbitrator to decide such questions. See
supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's decision in
Kaplan and the author's argument that Kaplan may support FAA preemption of state
arbitration law provisions that authorize the arbitrator to rule on questions of the scope
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FAA may preempt state law provisions authorizing arbitrators to
decide questions of the scope or validity of an arbitration
agreement would appear to depend on if factual circumstances
indicate that the parties intended such a result. Since it is unlikely
that many parties will address expressly in their arbitration
agreement the arbitrators' authority to rule on these questions, the
state law provisions examined authorizing the arbitrators to rule on
questions of the scope or validity of an arbitration agreement are
among the few state international arbitration act provisions
analyzed that the FAA may preempt in many cases.
Overall, few provisions contained in the state international
arbitration statutes examined conflict directly with provisions in
chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA or with the purposes or policies of the
FAA or the New York Convention. This suggests that the extent
of preemption of provisions in state international arbitration
statutes is not significant. The infrequency that provisions
contained in the state international arbitration statutes analyzed
conflict with FAA provisions or undermine the underlying
purposes or policies of the FAA or the New York Convention
confirms the "pro-arbitration" character of state international
arbitration statutes, enacted in order to encourage and facilitate
international arbitration within the respective state. Since most
provisions in the state international arbitration statutes examined
operate similarly to existing provisions in chapter 1 or 2 of the
FAA or supplement the FAA by authorizing court involvement
supportive of the arbitral process concerning matters not addressed
expressly in the FAA, the complementary character of most of
these state law provisions argues against the need for amending
the FAA in order to preempt state international arbitration statutes.
of an arbitration agreement when the parties have not clearly intended such a result.
Kaplan does not address directly whether arbitrators may decide questions of the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement only if the parties have clearly intended
such a result. However, the author contends that based on the FAA's purpose of
ensuring that arbitrations proceed in accordance with the parties' intent articulated by
the Court in Kaplan, the FAA would appear to preempt state law provisions that
authorize arbitrators to decide questions of the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement when the parties did not intend to confer such power on the arbitrator. For
further discussion, see supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
1997]
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IV. Impact of Volt and Mastrobuono Decisions on FAA
Preemption of Provisions in State International
Arbitration Statutes
Commentators have professed that the Supreme Court's
decision in Volt Information Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University247 heightened the uncertainty
concerning whether the FAA or state international arbitration
statutes apply to international arbitrations conducted in the United
States when the parties include a standard choice of law clause and
an arbitration agreement in their contract.248 In Volt, the Supreme
Court agreed with the decisions of the state courts that by
including a standard choice of law clause selecting state law, the
parties intended to incorporate state arbitration law into their
arbitration agreement, and consequently, the FAA could not
preempt the state arbitration law provision that the FAA would
appear to preempt in the absence of the choice of law clause.
Citing the apparent uncertainty concerning the applicable law
created by the enactment of state international arbitration statutes
and the Volt decision, commentators have argued for the reform of
federal law with the result that federal law would apply
exclusively to international arbitrations conducted in the United
States.249
This part contends that the Volt decision has not increased the
level of confusion or uncertainty pertaining to questions
concerning the law applicable to international arbitrations
conducted in the United States to an extent that justifies federal
statutory preemption of state international arbitration statutes.
First, the Volt decision appears consistent to a great extent with
prior Supreme Court precedent, since the Volt decision strongly
supports the federal substantive policy favoring the enforceability
247489 U.S. 468 (1989).
248See supra note 25. The author uses the term "standard choice of law clause"
to refer to a choice of law clause that selects state law without expressly providing that
the parties have agreed to apply state arbitration law to their arbitration. For example,
the author considers the following a standard choice of law clause: "the laws of the state
of New York shall apply." Under this definition, the choice of law clause at issue in
Volt is also a standard choice of law clause. See infra note 253.
249See supra note 26.
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of arbitration agreements. Second, in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,250 the
Court limited the potential negative implications of Volt by ruling
that a standard choice of law clause is not sufficient to indicate the
parties' intent to apply state arbitration law that the FAA would
otherwise preempt. Moreover, Mastrobuono suggests that state
arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA may only apply to an
arbitration if the parties include in their contract a choice of law
clause that expressly selects such state law over federal law.
In Volt, the Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of a
California Arbitration Act provision2 1' authorizing a court to stay
an arbitration pending related litigation between a party to the
arbitration and third parties not bound by the arbitration
agreement, in a case involving a domestic arbitration within the
scope of chapter 1 of the FAA. The FAA does not provide for
such a stay provision.
Denying Volt's motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of
the FAA and the analogous California Arbitration Act provision,
the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision.2
The California Court of Appeals based its decision on the parties'
choice of law clause, which the court interpreted as indicating that
the parties had incorporated the rules provided in California
arbitration law into their arbitration agreement.253 Citing the
parties' agreement to apply state rules of arbitration, the California
Court of Appeals rejected Volt's contention that the FAA
250115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
251Section 1281.2(c) of the general California Arbitration Act provides in
pertinent part that if a court determines that
[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or
special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or
series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact.... the court... may stay arbitration pending the
outcome of the court action or special proceeding.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1996).
252See Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 471-72 (1989).
253See id. at 472. The choice of law clause at issue in Volt provided that "the
Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located." Id. at
470.
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preempted the California arbitration provision.254
In affirming the decisions of the state courts, the Supreme
Court in Volt emphasized the FAA's strong support for enforcing
arbitration agreements in accordance with the terms agreed to by
the parties. The Volt Court declared that the FAA "simply
requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.
255
The Court's recognition in Volt of the FAA's central purpose of
ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements follows the
Court's strong support for this principle established in previous
cases.
256
254See id. at 472. The California Court of Appeals declared that
where, as here, the parties have chosen in their agreement to abide by the state
rules of arbitration, application of the FAA to prevent enforcement of those
rules would actually be inimical to the policies underlying state and federal
arbitration law, because it would force the parties to arbitrate in a manner
contrary to their agreement.
Id. at 472. Note that the California Supreme Court denied Volt's petition for
discretionary review. See id. at 472-73.
2551d. at 478.
256For discussion of Supreme Court precedent upholding the FAA's primary
purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms prior to the Volt
decision, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. Most lower courts have
interpreted Volt as upholding the federal policy derived from the FAA favoring the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly,
883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989). Holding that the FAA preempted state regulations that
limited the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the First Circuit in Connolly
distinguished its decision from Volt declaring that the state statutory provision at issue in
Volt "filled an interstice in the FAA . . . whereas the [r]egulations here . . . plainly
undermine the presumption of validity that the [Federal Arbitration] Act meant to confer
on arbitration contracts generally." Id. at 1119. One commentator professes that the
Volt decision clearly upholds the enforceability of arbitration agreements. "[I]f the
[Volt] Court has opened a window for courts to apply state law to contracts governed by
the FAA, the window has not been opened very wide. States are still foreclosed from
directly regulating arbitration agreements." Faith A. Kaminsky, Arbitration Law:
Choice-of-Law Clauses and the Power to Choose Between State and Federal Law, ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 527, 540 (1991). Most lower courts have also interpreted Volt as
upholding the federal policy derived from the FAA which strongly supports the
arbitrability of particular claims. See, e.g., Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328 (8th
Cir. 1989). The Ackerberg court stated that Volt "clearly does not hold that state law can
determine whether any given claim is arbitrable under the [FAA]." Id. at 1334.
Kaminsky professes that the Volt decision does not allow the parties' choice of state law
to affect questions of arbitrability under the FAA. "The parties' choice of law can only
be interpreted as affecting the question of how to proceed once a court decides that their
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Moreover, the Volt decision appears to allow the application of
state international arbitration act provisions that further the arbitral
process, even if the FAA contains no comparable provisions, when
there is a standard choice of law clause selecting the law of a state
that has enacted an international arbitration statute. In Volt, the
Supreme Court held that interpretation of a standard choice of law
clause to allow the application of rules of state arbitration law
where such state law rules are "manifestly designed to encourage
resort to the arbitral process" does not conflict with any policy
derived from the FAA.257 One commentator contends that the
interpretation of the choice of law clause affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Volt seems to allow courts to apply state law procedural
provisions that complement the FAA as long as such state law
provisions do not frustrate clearly articulated policies of the
FAA.25  This reasoning supports the application of state
international arbitration act provisions addressing such matters as
court-ordered discovery at the request of a party to an arbitration
or court-ordered provisional measures in aid of arbitration. As
discussed in part III, these state international arbitration act
provisions, which authorize judicial assistance in the arbitral
process not provided for in chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA, do not
appear to frustrate the purposes or policies embodied in the FAA
or the New York Convention.259
The problematic aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in
dispute is arbitrable. Because the arbitrability determination is governed by substantive
federal law, the parties' choice of law can have no effect on it." Kaminsky, supra, at
549. However, the Volt decision's support for FAA preemption of state law non-
arbitrability rules does not appear to have much relevance to preemption questions
involving state international arbitration statutes, which do not contain non-arbitrability
rules.
257 Volt, 489 U.S. at 476. The Volt Court professed that the California arbitral
rules deemed incorporated into the parties' arbitration agreement "generally foster[ed]
the federal policy favoring arbitration." Id. at 476 n.5. It is questionable whether one
can plausibly view the state arbitration law rule at issue in Volt, which authorized the
stay of an arbitration the FAA would have allowed to proceed, as supportive of the
arbitral process.
258See Feldman, supra note 86, at 692-93.
259For discussion concerning whether the FAA may preempt provisions
concerning court-ordered discovery at the request of a party and court-ordered
provisional measures in aid of arbitration, see supra notes 177-81 and supra notes 182-
220, respectively.
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Volt is that the stay of the parties' arbitration, which the FAA
would have allowed to proceed, was upheld because of the Court's
refusal to disturb the state courts' interpretation that the standard
choice of law clause selecting state law indicated the parties'
intentions to apply state arbitration law inconsistent with the
FAA.26 Criticizing the Volt decision, commentators profess that it
is not proper to interpret a standard choice of law clause selecting
state law as indicating the parties' intentions to apply state
arbitration law that the FAA would otherwise preempt.26'
Moreover, in his dissent in Volt, Justice Brennan espoused the
accepted position that standard choice of law clauses do not
indicate the parties' intentions to select state law over federal law.
Justice Brennan declared that
260 1n Volt, the Supreme Court did not itself hold that the parties intended their
standard choice of law clause to incorporate state arbitration law rules into their
arbitration agreement. Rather, the Supreme Court refused to disturb the California
courts' conclusion on the subject. The Supreme Court declared that "interpretation of
private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to
review." Volt, 489 U.S. at 474. Some commentators profess that the Volt Court's
deference to the state courts' interpretation of state law lessens the significance of Volt
as precedent for cases involving questions of whether the FAA may preempt state
arbitration law. "Volt appears to have been an aberration in the Court's pro-arbitration
stance, and should be considered more as a decision on states' rights in interpreting state
law than as a decision against FAA preemption of state arbitral laws." Rivkin &
Kellner, supra note 27, at 556. For criticism of the Volt Court's deference to state court
interpretation of choice-of-law clauses, see Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Right,
Choice-of-Law Clauses and State Rules and Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 159, 229-235
(1992).
261
,,[I]t is almost certainly a bad job of contractual interpretation to read a typical
choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement as choosing to be governed by state
arbitration law that would otherwise be preempted by the FAA." Ware, supra note 100,
at 556. Feldman comments that
If the broad pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, applicable unless displaced by
the mutual agreement of the parties, is to have any meaning, courts must require
more concrete manifestation of intent than boilerplate contractual provisions.
For courts to allow their interpretation of the contract to be guided so heavily
by policy considerations rather than by the actual language in the contract
threatens the ability of future contracting parties who may actually intend to
embrace the FAA to give legal effect to that intent.
Feldman, supra note 86, at 718. "Choice-of-law clauses are commonly used in domestic
contracts to determine which state law will apply, not to dilute the preemptive effect of
federal statutes." Robert Coulson, AAA President Says Volt Decision Creates Setback
for Arbitration, 3 BNA's ADR REPORT 135, 136 (1989).
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it seems to me beyond dispute that the normal purpose of such
[standard] choice of law clauses is to determine that the law of
one State rather than that of another State will be applicable;
they simply do not speak to any interaction between state and
federal law. A cursory glance at standard conflicts texts
confirms this observation: they contain no reference at all to
the relation between federal hnd state law in their discussions of
contractual choice of law clauses. 62
While the Volt decision does create uncertainty concerning
whether the FAA preempts inconsistent state arbitration law when
the parties have included a standard choice of law clause in their
contract, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. reveals that the Court has retreated
from its position in Volt concerning the interpretation of standard
choice of law clauses. As discussed below, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Mastrobuono professes that a standard choice of
law clause is not sufficient to indicate the parties' intentions to
apply state arbitration law that the FAA would otherwise preempt.
The central question in Mastrobuono concerns whether a
standard choice of law clause may preclude an arbitral award of
punitive damages that the FAA would otherwise allow absent the
conflicting state law.263 Citing the standard choice of law clause
selecting New York law and New York state case law holding that
arbitrators may not award punitive damages, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois vacated the
award of punitive damages and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.2"
Thus, the lower courts interpreted the arbitration agreement to
incorporate New York law, including the rule of New York case
262 Volt, 489 U.S. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing R. LEFLAR ET AL.,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 147 (4th ed. 1986)); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 632-652 (1982); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.3C
(2d ed. 1980)).
263The standard choice of law clause in Mastrobuono provides that the contract
"shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York." Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1214 (1995).
264See id. at 1215. In Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831, 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court,
held that arbitrators do not have the authority to award punitive damages under New
York law.
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law that arbitrators may not award punitive damages. 265
The Supreme Court framed the central issue in Mastrobuono
as whether the contract reveals that the parties intended to arbitrate
claims of punitive damages.2" The Court found that the standard
choice of law clause selecting New York law was not sufficient to
indicate that the parties intended for the New York decisional rule
prohibiting punitive damages awards to apply to their arbitration.267
The Mastrobuono court declared that
[we] think the best way to harmonize the choice of law
provision with the arbitration provision is to read 'the laws of
the State of New York' to encompass substantive principles that
New York courts would apply, but not to include special rules
limiting the authority of arbitrators. Thus, the choice of law
provision covers the rights and duties of the parties, while the
arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes
upon the other."'
Commentators profess that the Court's decision in
Mastrobuono reveals that standard choice of law clauses selecting
state law should not result in the application of state arbitration
law that the FAA would otherwise preempt.2 69 Thus, the Court's
265See Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215.
266See id. at 1216.
267See id. at 1218-19.
268Id. at 1219.
2691n the future, courts must carefully review all relevant evidence relating
to the intent of the parties as to whether the applicable law clause was intended
to cover only substantive rights and duties, or was also intended to embrace the
arbitration law of the state . . . if no evidence exists beyond the typical
applicable law clause in Mastrobuono, the FAA will preempt state arbitration
law as to that contract.
William E. Huth, International Decisions: Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (1995).
Mastrobuono establishes that choice of law provisions are properly interpreted
to exclude a particular matter from arbitration or to limit the arbitration
proceeding in a manner inconsistent with the FAA, only when the parties'
contract clearly and unequivocally evidences a mutual intent to that effect.
Given the "boilerplate" nature and vague wording of the typical contractual
choice of law provision, that result seems unlikely in most cases.
Hayford, supra note 94, at 21. The result in Mastrobuono appears to conflict with the
Supreme Court's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court held that a forum selection clause requiring
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decision in Mastrobuono would appear to alleviate the concerns of
commentators who feared that Volt would create significant
uncertainty regarding whether the FAA would preempt
inconsistent state arbitration law in cases involving standard
choice of law clauses selecting state law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono
suggests that state arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA may
only apply to an arbitration if the parties include a choice of law
clause that expressly reveals the parties' intentions to have such a
state law provision apply. While holding that the standard choice
of law clause selecting New York law was not sufficient to
indicate that the parties intended the New York rule precluding
arbitral awards of punitive damages to apply to their arbitration,
the Supreme Court declared in Mastrobuono that "if the contract
says 'no punitive damages' that is the end of the matter, for courts
are bound to interpret contracts in accordance with the expressed
intentions of the parties-even if the effect of those intentions is to
limit arbitration.""27 Commentators have viewed Mastrobuono as
requiring an express contractual clause providing for the
application of state arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA in
order for such state law to apply to the parties' arbitration."' The
litigation of all disputes in Florida contained in a cruise line's standard form passenger
contract was reasonable and enforceable. However, one commentator professes that the
Supreme Court in Mastrobuono was troubled by the rigid interpretation of Volt by the
lower courts which allowed the standard choice of law clause selecting New York state
law to preclude the arbitration of punitive damages claims. Huth, supra, at 602. Prior to
Mastrobuono, securities firms used a standard-form brokerage contract that included a
clause that all disputes be resolved by arbitration and a standard choice of law clause
selecting New York state law in order to avoid arbitral awards of punitive damages. See
id.
270Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
271
"Mastrobuono establishes that choice-of-law provisions are properly
interpreted to exclude a particular matter from arbitration, or to limit the arbitration
proceeding in a manner inconsistent with the FAA, only when the parties' contract
clearly and unequivocally evidences a mutual intent to that effect." Hayford, supra note
94, at 21. Huth professes that after Mastrobuono parties may agree not to allow the
arbitrators to award punitive damages, contrary to federal law derived from the FAA, by
including a contractual provision that specifically limits the authority of the arbitrators
to award punitive damages. See Huth, supra note 269, at 603. However, after
Mastrobuono, the parties may not use a standard choice of law clause. selecting state law
as a means to preclude the arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. See id. Prior to
the Mastrobuono decision, Ware articulated a hypothetical example of a choice of law
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Mastrobuono decision as well as the Supreme Court's unyielding
support for advancing the FAA's primary purpose of enforcing
arbitration agreements according to their terms indicate that parties
may choose not to apply federal law derived from the FAA that
concerns matters of arbitral procedural by including in their
contract a choice of law clause that expressly provides for the
application of particular state arbitration law provisions."
Overall, the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono appears
to resolve the uncertainties created by the Court's decision in Volt
concerning whether a standard choice of law clause selecting state
law results in the application of state arbitration law that the FAA
would otherwise preempt if the parties had not included such a
choice of law clause. Mastrobuono reveals that a standard choice
of law clause is not sufficient to indicate the parties' intent to
apply state arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA. 73
Moreover, the Court's decision in Mastrobuono also suggests that
state arbitration law inconsistent with the FAA may apply only if
the parties include in their contract a choice of law clause that
expressly selects such state law over federal law.274  Thus, the
Mastrobuono decision appears to clarify the interaction between
provisions in the FAA and state international arbitration statutes to
an extent which obviates the professed need to amend the FAA in
clause that expressly selects state law over federal law on the question of whether the
arbitrators may award punitive damages. "The law of New York, rather than federal
law, governs whether our arbitrator has the power to award punitive damages." Ware
supra note 100, at 557. Ware comments that this hypothetical choice of law clause is
"truly unusual because it expressly chooses state law over federal law" revealing the
parties' intentions "to displace otherwise preemptive federal law." Id. at 558.
272For discussion of Supreme Court precedent advancing the FAA's primary
purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms, see supra notes 18-
24 and accompanying text. For discussion of the ability of parties to apply state law
procedural provisions that conflict with federal law derived from the FAA, see supra
note 25.
273See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
274For example, the FAA may preempt sections 1297.163 and 1297.165 of the
California international arbitration statute which appear to create a mandatory rule
authorizing the arbitrators to decide questions of arbitrability. See supra note 238.
However, Mastrobuono suggests that the parties could have these state law provisions
apply to their arbitration by including a choice of law clause such as the following:
"Sections 1297.163 and 1297.165 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, rather than
federal law, govern whether the arbitrators have the authority to decide questions of
arbitrability."
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order to preempt state international arbitration statutes.275
V. Conclusion
State international arbitration statutes play an important but
secondary role in governing international arbitrations within the
respective state. As discussed in part II, state international
arbitration act provisions may only apply (1) when the FAA does
not preempt such state law provisions or (2) when the arbitration
agreement or arbitral award does not fall within the scope of
chapter 1 or 2 of the FAA but is within the scope of the state
international arbitration statute.276 Moreover, as revealed in part
III, since most state international arbitration act provisions
complement or supplement the provisions in chapters 1 and 2 of
the FAA, the FAA will not preempt state international arbitration
act provisions in most instances.277 Based on the secondary role
assumed by state international arbitration statutes and the
complementary character of most provisions contained in such
state statutes, amendment of the FAA to preempt state
international arbitration statutes does not appear justified.
Furthermore, part IV contends that the Supreme Court's
275in response to the Volt decision, the New York State Bar Report recommends
amendments to chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA that expressly preempt provisions in state
international arbitration statutes unless the parties' arbitration agreement provides
explicitly that "procedures other than those set forth in Chapter 1 [of the FAA] govern
the action or proceeding." See supra note 26. These amendments proposed in the New
York State Bar Report require an express contractual provision declaring the parties'
intentions to apply state arbitration law in order to apply state arbitration law provisions
that the FAA would not preempt because such state law provisions are consistent with
the FAA. Thus, these proposed amendments are not consistent with the Mastrobuono
decision, which requires an express choice of law clause selecting a particular state law
provision over federal law in order to apply state arbitration law that the FAA would
otherwise preempt. Mastrobuono does not require such an express choice of law clause
selecting particular state arbitration law provisions in order for the parties to apply a
state arbitration law provision that complements the FAA. Requiring a choice of law
clause expressly selecting particular state arbitration law provisions over federal law in
order for state law provisions that complement the FAA to apply could preclude the
application of state international arbitration act provisions authorizing court involvement
supportive of the international arbitral process. For further discussion, see the author's
conclusions in part V.
276See supra notes 32-78 and accompanying text.
277See supra notes 79-246 and accompanying text.
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decision in Mastrobuono requires that the parties include in their
contract a choice of law clause that expressly selects state
arbitration law over federal law in order for a state arbitration law
provision inconsistent with the FAA to apply to an arbitration.27
The Mastrobuono decision appears to dispel the fears of
commentators who contended that the Volt decision created
significant uncertainty concerning whether the FAA would
preempt inconsistent state arbitration law in cases involving
standard choice of law clauses selecting state law. Thus, the
Supreme Court's reversal of its problematic position in Volt
further argues against the need for enacting an amendment to the
FAA that would preempt state international arbitration statutes.
Federal statutory preemption of state international arbitration
statutes would also limit parties in their choice of the legal
framework applicable to an international arbitration conducted in
the United States. Preemption of state international arbitration
statutes would create a predictable and certain legal regime.
However, the inability of parties to invoke state international
arbitration act provisions that further the international arbitral
process and that concern matters not addressed in the FAA, such
as court-ordered discovery or provisional measures, outweighs any
benefits accruing from the adoption of a uniform legal regime
applicable to all international arbitrations conducted in the United
States. The coexistence of chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA and
differing state international arbitration statutes provides sufficient
certainty to parties since the FAA will preempt few provisions in
such state statutes, while offering the parties choices among varied
legal frameworks supportive of the international arbitral process.
"
8 See supra notes 271-72, 274 and accompanying text.
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